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INTRODUCTION 
The economic relationship between the European Community 
(EC or Community) and the United States faced a number of 
significant challenges during 1991 and early 1992. Historic events 
such as the Persian Gulf War and relations with eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union played a particularly important role 
in bilateral dealings. Nonetheless, a continuing series of trade 
negotiations and disputes also played out in Washington, Brus-
sels, and Geneva. 
This Article describes international trade relations between the 
United States and the EC during 1991 and early 1992. Part I of 
the Article summarizes the current state of the trade relationship. 
Part II offers a detailed description of the most important trade 
issues which have occupied the attention of U.S. and EC govern-
ment officials during 1991 and early 1992. Part III outlines the 
institutions and mechanisms of the two governments for address-
ing trade issues. This Article concludes that the United States 
and the EC-the two most important forces in liberalizing world 
trade-face a period of increasing trade friction. The Article 
attempts to present a balanced discussion of both U.S. and EC 
trade concerns. It places somewhat more emphasis, however, on 
U.S. issues and arguments to reflect the interests of U.S. readers. 
* Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.; Managing Partner of Brussels, Bel-
gium office, specializing in international trade law; J.D. 1982, Georgetown University; 
B.A. 1976, Yale University. 
** Associate, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C., practicing international trade law; 
J.D. 1984, University of Michigan Law School; B.A., 1981, St. John's College (Annapolis, 
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I. CURRENT STATE OF EC-U.S. TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
The overall trading relationship between the United States and 
the EC-each other's largest single trading partner and the two 
largest trading entities in the world I-has been characterized by 
an unprecedented growth in trade over the past five years and a 
general balance in trade since 1989. In 1991, the United States 
exported $103.2 billion in merchandise to the EC, which ac-
counted for approximately 25 percent of all U.S. exports and an 
increase of almost 100 percent since 1986.2 Europe has been the 
fastest growing market for U.S. exports over the past two years. 3 
U.S. imports from the EC equaled $86.5 billion in 1991, or ap-
proximately 20 percent of all U.S. imports, resulting in a mod-
erate U.S. surplus of $16.7 billion in the bilateral trade balance.4 
Despite this growing and balanced exchange of goods and 
services, a more confrontational edge has entered the relationship 
in recent months as the Community and the United States grap-
ple with a variety of difficult issues in the Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade5 
(GATT) and pursue their own increasingly separate trade agen-
das.6 This tension also comes at a time when economic relations 
increasingly will define the EC-U.S. bilateral relationship. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dramatic changes in 
eastern and central Europe have reduced the well-defined threat 
that motivated close cooperation between western Europe and 
the United States over the past forty-five years. As the importance 
I See Glennon J. Harrison, European Community Trade and Investment with the United States, 
at 1 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Mar. 7, 1990). 
2 See U.S. Department of Commerce News, U.S. Merchandise Trade, FT-900, at 12 
(Dec. 1991) [hereinafter U.S. Merchandise Trade]. 
3 Id. at 12-13. 
4 Id. These numbers reflect the absence of a structural imbalance in EC-U.S. trade. If 
a trade gap develops, it is the result of changes in exchange rates or the relative rates of 
growth of the two economies. See Stephen Woolcock, Market Access Issues in EC-U.S. 
Relations, at 7-8 (Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991). 
Over the past 12 years, the United States has enjoyed a trade surplus with the EC six 
times and the EC has had a bilateral surplus six times. See Bus. AMER., Feb. 24, 1992, at 
5 (U.S. Department of Commerce Publication). 
5 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral agreement 
and a forum for negotiating trade problems. The fundamental principles of GATT are 
the most favored nation rule-that a country provide the same treatment to all GATT 
members-and the national treatment principle-that imports receive the same treatment 
as domestic products. See generally JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). 
6 For a discussion of the contrast between EC-U.S. interdependence and the increas-
ingly fractioned political relations, see Woolcock, supra note 4, at 7. 
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of security and defense matters declines, the importance of eco-
nomic issues will grow. As one V.S. Congressional leader stated 
in January, "the Cold War is over, and the focus is on economic 
issues.'" 
This change of focus does not play into current V.S. strengths. 
The recession in the Vnited States which began in 1991 weakened 
the V.S. position in world trade negotiations. Moreover, the di-
minishing V.S. military role in Europe removes an important 
motivation for European cooperation on trade and economic 
matters.8 
For its part, the EC has been preoccupied with an intimidating 
economic and trade agenda, much of which does not directly 
involve the Vnited States. The Single Market Plan9 to eliminate 
internal market barriers is approaching its January 1, 1993 dead-
line and has dominated European political dialogue for most of 
the past five years. The new treaty on European V nion 10 ap-
proved in December 1991-which many consider to be the most 
important landmark in the development of the EC since the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC 
Treaty)--diverted the Community's attention from GATT ne-
gotiations and other trade matters during much of 1991. 
Several important regional trade matters also occupied EC 
trade officials. The Community pursued negotiations with the 
seven nations of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)ll 
to bring EFTA rules in line with EC law and to create a single 
market of nineteen nations. These negotiations resulted in an 
agreement in late 1991, but a European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
ruling in December struck down the judicial aspects of the accord 
7 Guy Gugliotta, Democrats Seek Broader Trade Policy Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1992, 
at A22. 
8 See Ann Devroy & Glenn Frankel, Troops, Trade Pact Not Linked, Bush Says, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 12, 1992, at A25. 
9 See generally Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to 
the European Council, COM(85) 310 final. 
IO The treaty lays the basis for the Community to implement its plan for a single 
currency in some EC states by 1999 at the latest. It also includes provisions intended to 
initiate a common foreign and defense policy, and makes other changes in the treaties 
creating the Community. An official text has yet to be released. 
II Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein are the 
members of the seven-nation European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Most of these 
countries have not, until recently, sought membership in the Community. EFTA accounts 
for nearly 25 percent of the Community'S trade. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 1. 
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and forced intense efforts in early 1992 to devise a judicial alter-
native to save the agreement. 12 
The Community spent much of 1991 looking east rather than 
west, as relations with central Europe and the Republics of the 
former Soviet Union took on increased importance. The Com-
munity negotiated Association Accords with Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Hungary. These trade-liberalizing agreements in-
volved many difficult issues. 13 Some U.S. officials expressed 
concern that the agreements could harm U.S. interests. They 
alleged that the Community was urging the three countries to 
raise tariffs on non-EC imports in return for increased access to 
the EC market and that the Community might encourage the 
countries to adopt EC rather than international product stan-
dards. As 1992 began, the Community also began to consider 
negotiation of new bilateral trade agreements with each of the 
Republics of the former Soviet Union to replace the single agree-
ment which had governed trade relations. 14 
The United States also pursued an important regional trade 
agreement during 1991 and early 1992, which some argued weak-
ened its commitment or ability to complete the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. In 1991, President Bush announced his intention 
to negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
with Mexico and Canada to remove barriers to trade among the 
three countries. 15 Despite significant obstacles, U.S. officials were 
predicting in early 1992 that the NAFTA agreement might be 
signed by the end of that year. 16 
When Europe and the United States addressed trade issues 
beyond their own region, Japan was most frequently the target 
of attention. Japan is the primary source of both governments' 
trade deficits, accounting for $43.3 billion of the U.S. deficit and 
12 See Janet McEvoy, EC Meets to Save Market Plans After Court Finding, Reuters, Dec. 
15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. 
13 The objective of these agreements is to establish a free trade zone between the 
Community and the three east European countries over the next 10 years. Official texts 
had not been released as of early 1992. Similar agreements will be negotiated with Bulgaria 
and Romania in the near future. See Europe 1992, Int'l Division U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, 1991,55-56. 
14 Council Decision 90/116, 19900.]. (L 68) 1. 
15 Joint Statement Announcing Canada-Mexico-United States Trilateral Free Trade 
Negotiations, 27 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 133 (Feb. 5, 1991); Notice of a North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,454 (1991). 
16 See Prospects for Concluding NAFTA Talks in Near Future Are Good, Bolten Says, 8 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1542 (Oct. 23, 1991). 
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$29.8 billion of the EC deficitP United States relations with Japan 
deteriorated throughout 1991, and a series of controversies in 
early 1992 raised the most serious threat in decades that Congress 
would enact trade-restricting legislation aimed atJapan. President 
Bush's controversial trip to Japan in January 1992 resulted in a 
Japanese commitment to attempt to increase purchases of U.S. 
autos, auto parts, and other products which have contributed to 
the bilateral trade deficit. IS This prompted EC officials, including 
External Affairs Commissioner Frans Andriessen, to protest that 
the agreement represented an attempt to manage U .S.-J apanese 
bilateral trade to the detriment of the EC. EC officials stated that 
the agreement particularly discriminated against EC automakers 
and threatened an appeal to GATT.19 
EC relations with Japan did not reach such a low level. None-
theless, the Community's concern about Japanese imports contin-
ued to grow, as exemplified by the automobile voluntary restraint 
agreement with Japan in July 1991. The United States watched 
that agreement closely, gaining assurances from the Community 
that European imports of automobiles produced in the United 
States by Japanese companies would not be limited. 
In this environment, the United States and the EC made less 
progress than both sides would have liked in pursuing their mul-
tilateral and bilateral trade agendas. The most important enter-
prise-the Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT-managed to 
get back on track during 1991 after breaking down at the disas-
trous Ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1990. After 
negotiators made significant progress during the final months of 
1991, they agreed to work through April 1992 to reach a final 
package. Nonetheless, in early March 1992 the future of the 
Uruguay Round remained uncertain, primarily because of a split 
between the United States and the Community on reducing EC 
agricultural subsidies. EC-U.S. disagreement also was a potential 
17 U.S. Merchandise Trade, supra note 2, at 12. 
18 See Hills Says japanese Automotive Commitments Are Not Government Agreements, 10 Inside 
U.S. Trade No.4, at 16 (jan. 24, 1992). 
19 See EC Notebook, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 16, 1992, at 1; see also EC Warns U.S.-japan 
Deal Will Fan Trade Tensions, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter EC 
Warns]; Terence Roth, Europe is Growing Uneasy Over U.S.-japan Trade Pacts, WALL ST. J. 
EUR., Mar. 9, 1992, at 2. EC officials have expressed similar concerns about U.S.-China 
agreements on shipping practices and intellectual property protection. See David Buchan, 
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at 7. 
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obstacle to GATT agreements in other areas, such as tariff re-
ductions and the general reduction of subsidies. 
Nor was significant progress made in resolving EC-U.S. bilat-
eral disputes, despite the involvement of senior level political 
figures from both governments. The long-standing controversies 
regarding European subsidies to the Airbus consortium and U.S. 
complaints about EC oilseed subsidies remained unresolved in 
March 1992 despite decisions of GATT dispute settlement panels. 
The U.S. and EC efforts to develop a new Multilateral Steel 
Agreement made modest headway during 1991 but faced difficult 
obstacles in early 1992.20 EC opposition to U.S. unilateral trade 
measures, particularly Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
(Section 301)21 and EC concern about U.S. restrictions on foreign 
investment resulted in no changes. 
The two governments had more success in resolving trade 
disputes based on differing technical standards and divergent 
regulatory policies.22 The U.S. and EC reached an agreement in 
September ending their dispute about EC meat processing re-
quirements which had disqualified many U.S. meat processors. 
They also concluded an agreement regarding residue permitted 
in U.S. corn gluten feed which had kept U.S. products out of the 
EC market during part of 1991. A similar agreement was reached 
concerning EC testing requirements for wine which would have 
restricted imports of U.S. wine. 
The United States and EC also began new cooperative efforts 
in other fields. On September 23, 1991, the two governments 
signed an agreement to promote cooperation and coordination 
in the enforcement of antitrust law.23 On November 4, 1991, they 
held the first of ongoing bilateral meetings designed to discuss 
recent cases and implementation issues.24 The EC-U .S. Joint Con-
20 See Virginia Gannon, Subsidies are bane of MSA, AMER. METALS MKT., Feb. 3, 1992, 
at 3, 9. 
21 Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West Supp. 1991). 
22 Issues resulting from divergent regulatory policies have become an increasingly 
important source of bilateral tension. These policies may intentionally or unintentionally 
have a trade distorting effect. See Woolcock, supra note 4, at 2. 
23 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Compe-
tition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, BULL. EC 9-1991, point 1.2.14. 
24 See EC, U.S. Officials Hold First Talks Under Bilateral Cooperation Agreement, Daily Rep. 
for Executives (BNA) No. 215, at A-I (Nov. 6, 1991). 
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sultative Group on Science and Technology met several times 
during 1991 to discuss areas of scientific cooperation.25 An agree-
ment was reached in September 1991 between the Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Project (SEMATECH) in the United States and 
the Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative (JESSI) in the 
Community to cooperate in developing new semiconductor tech-
nologies.26 
The two governments entered 1992 with much at stake. It is 
not inevitable that the multilateral trading system will be seriously 
threatened or that a bilateral trade war will result from a break-
down in the Uruguay Round or the inability to resolve ongoing 
disagreements such as the Airbus dispute. In March 1992, there 
remained reason to believe that negotiators could find a way to 
salvage the GATT negotiations during the remainder of 1992, 
or even 1993. 
Nevertheless, the United States and the EC-the major driving 
forces in liberalizing world trade for the past forty-five years-
unquestionably face a period of increasing trade friction. If the 
Uruguay Round fails, the United States and Europe will be forced 
to address in bilateral negotiations, and in an environment of 
accusation and frustration, a range of complicated and difficult 
matters which had been the subject of the multilateral GATT 
talks. If the Uruguay Round succeeds, the United States and the 
EC will suffer from a strained relationship as they attempt to 
resolve a series of pending and new disputes.27 
Each government is concerned that the other is drifting from 
its commitment to an open multilateral trading system. The EC 
fears that the United States increasingly is turning toward a pref-
erence for managed trade, and toward bilateral solutions for 
trade problems in which it uses the threat of U.S. retaliation to 
win concessions.28 The United States is fearful that the EC is 
focusing excessively on its European trading partners and is un-
2. See EC/United States/Science: Results of the Second Meeting of the Joint Consultative Group 
on Science and Technology, Europe (Agence Europe) No. 5618, at 9 (Nov. 28, 1991). 
26 Peter Nielsen, JESSI and SEMATECH Sign Formal Cooperation Pact, Reuters, Sept. 21, 
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. The success of the cooperation has 
been limited. See also Yuko Inoue, SEMATECH Turns to Japan for Chip Insight, NIKKEI 
WKLY., jan. 25,1992, at 1. 
27 See 'Hour of Truth' for GATT, Dutch Official Says, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 17, 1992, 
at 2. 
28 See EC Warns, supra note 19, at 1. 
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willing to make changes in its agricultural program and other 
policies to accommodate U.S. interests.29 
The temperature of the EC-U.S. trade debate unquestionably 
has increased. In January, President Bush accused the EC of 
building an "iron curtain of protectionism" for European agri-
cultural products. 3D The same week, EC Competition Commis-
sioner Leon Brittan complained of "mounting evidence that the 
United States is drifting toward a preference for managed 
trade."31 In mid-February, a controversy erupted over comments 
by U.S. officials linking U.S. military commitments in Europe to 
the Community's willingness to reach a Uruguay Round agree-
ment.32 In this environment, a successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round will be necessary if U.S. and Community officials 
are to prevent these tensions and potential problems from ex-
panding further. 33 
II. EC-U.S. TRADE DEVELOPMENTS IN 1991 AND EARLY 1992 
A. Uruguay Round Negotiations 
The ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations under the auspices 
of GATT are multilateral negotiations involving numerous coun-
tries, both developed and developing. Nonetheless, the United 
States and the EC have dominated the talks. In part, the GATT 
Round has become the forum for the EC and the United States 
to address issues which also could have been resolved in a bilateral 
context. 
The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 and was scheduled 
to be completed prior to the end of 1990, but completion was 
extended until April 1992, with the possibility of further exten-
sion.34 The success of the talks remained in jeopardy in early 
1992, however, due largely to unresolved disagreements between 
29 See Leonard Silk, What Price a Breakdown Olthe Uruguay Round?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
Feb. 29, 1992, at 9. 
30 See President Bush Says EC Holding Up Progress in GAIT Trade Negotiations, 9 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No.3, at 99 (jan. 15, 1992). 
31 See EC Warns, supra note 19, at 2. 
32 See Tim Carrington, Quayle Says U.S. Isolationists Lack Broad Support, WALL ST. J. EUR., 
Feb. 12, 1992, at 2; see also GATT: Strong Reaction But No Official Statement On Quayle'S 
Comments, Eur. Rep. (European Information Service) No. 1743, at 7 (Feb. 12, 1992). 
33 See President Bush Denies Any Link Between GAIT Talks, European Security, 9 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No.8, at 296 (Feb. 19, 1992) (comments of Foreign Minister Hans van den 
Broek of the Netherlands). 
34 See So Close, and Yet So Far, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1992, at 62. 
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the United States and the EC. The fact that the relationship 
between the United States and the Community has been the 
driving force behind the GATT negotiations-commonly recog-
nized as the most important undertaking in world trade regula-
tion-shows the significance of this relationship for the world 
trading system. 
Unfortunately, over the past year the EC-U.S. trade relation-
ship, as played out in the GATT negotiations, has been difficult 
and frustrating. Even the overall importance of a successful 
round recently has been the source of disagreement, with an EC 
official claiming that the negative consequences for the world 
economy would not be as grave as the U.S. portrayal would 
indicate.35 Following is a brief description of the major areas of 
EC-U.S. dispute, and several areas of agreement, in the Uruguay 
Round. 
1. Dispute on Agricultural Subsidies 
Observers generally have viewed the disagreement between the 
United States and the EC over agricultural subsidies as the most 
important deal-breaking issue of the entire Uruguay Round. The 
GATT Round broke down following the GATT Ministerial meet-
ings in December 1990 in Brussels, largely as a consequence of 
the parties' inability to agree on the level of reduction in agricul-
tural subsidies.36 The fourteen large agricultural producing coun-
tries, known as the Cairns Group, favored reduction of subsidies 
world-wide, while the EC, Korea, and Japan were unable to make 
such a commitment. 37 
The Community and the United States have agreed that reform 
in the area of farm subsidies is needed. The percent of farm 
income accounted for by subsidies in 1990 was 48 percent for the 
Community and 30 percent for the United States, costing the 
governments of each billions of dollars.38 The difficulty has come 
in negotiating the extent, manner, and timing of reductions in 
subsidies. 
35 See EC Commissioner Andriessen Downplays Consequences of Possible GAIT Failure, 9 Int') 
TTade Rep. (BNA) No.4, at 159 (Jan. 22, 1992). 
36 See Katz Insists EC Must Agree to Agricultural Framework to Jumpstart GAIT Talks, 8 
Inside U.S. TTade No. 51, at I, II (Dec. 21, 1990). 
37 See Cairns Group Says It Will Not Accept a "Cosmetic" Agricultural Agreement, 8 Int') 
TTade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1807 (Dec. II, 1991). 
38 OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, MARKETS, AND TRADE: MONITORING AND OUTLOOK 
17,26 (1991). 
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Historical incongruities between the subsidy systems in the two 
countries account for some of the problems. The U.S. subsidy 
system consists largely of domestic price maintenance, quotas on 
imports, and export subsidies. The basis of the EC system, the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),39 is based on a complex 
mechanism of variable import levies and restitution payments. As 
a consequence, the parties have had difficulty in arriving at a 
threshold consensus on what constitutes equivalent reduction and 
how to measure the level of existing subsidization.40 
The United States has taken the position that its entire system 
is the subject of negotiation. As a method for reducing some 
types of subsidies, the United States has proposed replacing trade 
barriers with tariffs-known as "tariffication." For other types of 
subsidies, it has proposed quantification and commitments to 
eliminate subsidies over ten years.41 The Community has been 
willing to agree to progressive reduction but has not committed 
to an actual timetable for reduction. The EC also has not com-
mitted to the ultimate goal of tariffication: the eventual complete 
elimination of subsidies. Instead, the EC advocates that reduc-
tions in barriers for one product be offset by an increase in 
restrictions on another product, as long as the overall level of 
protection declines. 
On the eve of completion of the single market, the Community 
has found it fundamentally difficult to dismantle the CAP as a 
result of years of political compromise within the Community. 
The EC has been placed in an essentially defensive position, and 
its goal has been to maintain the CAP with some modification.42 
The negotiating text considered in March and April 1992-the 
so-called Dunkel text43--called for a 36 percent reduction in ex-
port subsidies and a 20 percent reduction in domestic support. 
This represented a balance between the United States and the 
39 See OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, EUROPEAN 
UNIFICATION-THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 45 (Jan. 1990). 
40 See U.S.-EC Differences Over Farm Trade Seen Continuing to Threaten GATT Talks, 8 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1680 (Nov. 20, 1991). 
41 See COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND 54 (Jeffrey J. Schott, ed. 1990). 
42 See Karen E. Donfried & Julie Kim, European-U.S. Relations: Current Issues (Congres-
sional Research Service Issue Brief, Jan. 23, 1992), at 9-10. 
43 On December 20, 1991, Arthur Dunkel, GATT's director-general, handed down a 
500-page draft final agreement. The Dunkel text represents a unification of 30 separate 
agreements, including controversial finishing touches. See ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1991, at 
83. 
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Cairns Group, which favored further reductions, and the Com-
munity and Japan, among others, which preferred less.44 The EC 
objected to the Dunkel text, mainly on the ground that it did not 
categorize payments to farmers for price and production cuts as 
permissible subsidies.4s The Community has planned to use such 
payments in its reform of the CAP.46 
2. Tariff Reductions Increasing Market Access 
Other than the disagreement over agricultural subsidies, the 
crucial issue requiring resolution before completion of the 
Uruguay Round was tariff reductionY From the outset, the ne-
gotiations on tariff barriers were marked by disagreement be-
tween the EC and the United States. The United States advocated 
negotiation on a product-by-product, request-offer basis while 
the EC advocated a formula approach, with greater reductions 
applying to higher tariffs. 48 
Accordingly, the United States has promoted a "zero-for-zero" 
initiative. This would result in a complete reduction of tariffs on 
certain products, such as aluminum, appliances, beer, computers, 
medical devices, construction equipment, semiconductors, and 
wood products.49 On the other hand, the EC approach has fo-
cused on overall reduction of tariffs with higher tariffs targeted 
for the greatest reductions.so The EC position reflected the fact 
that the U.S. tariffs are high by world standards on certain sen-
sitive products such as textiles, footwear, and glass. Thus, the 
Community has aimed to reduce the so-called U.S. "tariff 
peaks."sl 
United States industry and Congress have viewed these market 
access issues as crucial to the conclusion of a successful Uruguay 
Round package. The most intensive activity on these negotiations 
44 See GAIT's Trade Talks: Final Sprint-or Stumble, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1992, at 73. 
45 [d. 
46 /d. 
47 See U.S., EC Market Access Dispute Holds Up Uruguay Round Negotiations, 10 Inside U.S. 
Trade No.7, at I (Feb. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Market Access Dispute]. 
48 See Ways & Means Staff Warns of State Dept. Pressure for Minimal GAIT Deal, 9 Inside 
U.S. Trade No. 47, at 3 (Nov. 22, 1991) [hereinafter Ways & Means Staff Warns]. 
49 [d. See Uruguay Round Market Access Negotiations, U.S. Views (June 10, 1991) 
(unpublished U.S. negotiating document) (on file with authors). 
50 See Ways & Means Staff Warns, supra note 48, at 3. 
51 See U.S., EC Square Off Over Market Access on Top of Agriculture Fight, 10 Inside U.S. 
Trade No.6, at I (Feb. 7, 1992). 
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had yet to occur in early 1992. It appeared, however, that the EC 
would accept the U.S. zero tariff proposal for some items, that 
the United States would accept restrictions in some peak tariffs, 
and that an agreement in the market access negotiations could 
be reached. As of February 1992, the United States and the EC 
had agreed to the goal of zero tariffs in the pharmaceutical and 
steel sectors, and possibly in the construction and medical equip-
ment sectors.52 For other sectors, however, there was no agree-
ment.53 
3. Reductions in Subsidies 
The negotiating positions of the United States and the Com-
munity in the subsidies area have broadly reflected their positions 
in the agricultural subsidies negotiations: the United States has 
aimed to limit subsidies as much as possible, whereas the Com-
munity has had less ambitious objectives. The approach taken by 
the subsidies negotiating group was to employ a "traffic-light" 
method. It designated certain types of subsidies as red-, yellow-, 
or green-light depending on an economic analysis of trade-dis-
torting potential. 54 
The EC proposed to "green-light," that is designate as per se 
allowable, subsidies for regional development and for research 
and development. Under U.S. countervailing duty law, regional 
subsidies and subsidies for research and development-if the 
result of the research is not made widely available-are deemed 
impermissible, actionable subsidies.55 In early 1992, the United 
States indicated that it might be flexible with respect to regional 
subsidies, as long as industry-specific regional subsidies are coun-
tervailable.56 
4. Intellectual Property Protection 
The negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPs) began with the developed countries, including 
52 Market Access Dispute, supra note 47, at 1. 
53 [d. 
54 See Schott, supra note 41, at 96. 
55 See Senior U.S. Trade Official Acknowledges Easing of u.s. Subsidies Stance, 9 Inside U.S. 
Trade No. 49, at 1 (Dec. 6, 1991). 
56 [d. 
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the United States and the EC. These negotiations attempted to 
raise the level of protection afforded in the developing coun-
tries,57 but quickly became contentious between the United States 
and the EC. The original, primary goal of the talks, to some 
extent, has been lost. 
In the copyright area, the United States and the EC debated 
the issue of so-called "moral rights." Under the EC system, an 
author's right to be known as the author and to prevent deform-
ing changes to his or her work survive any sale of the work. 58 
Recent legislation changed U.S. common law, providing limited 
protection for moral rights for the first time. In 1990, Congress 
enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act, establishing the right of 
artists, photographers, sculptors, and printmakers to protect their 
work from unauthorized mutilation or change.59 Powerful indus-
tries such as the U.S. motion picture and publishing industries 
strongly opposed moral rights legislation in the United States.60 
They viewed the continuing interference by authors after sale of 
their work as potentially disruptive to the established structure 
of their industries. 
In the patent area, the U.S. and EC systems differ as well. The 
U.S. system awards the patent to the first individual to invent the 
product,61 whereas the EC system awards the patent to the first 
individual to file a legal record of the invention.62 The Commu-
nity has maintained that the United States applies its rules in a 
discriminatory manner because it applies its first-to-invent rule 
to domestic inventors only.63 The Community's position is that 
the United States, which is the only remaining country with the 
first-to-invent system, should conform its laws.64 The United 
57 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-87-65, STRENGTHENING WORLD-
WIDE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter 
STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE PROTECTION]' 
58 This concept is included in the multilateral copyright treaty, the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 6 bis, revised Paris, 
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235. The United States has been a 
signatory since only 1989. 
59 See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 
106A (West Supp. 1991». 
60 See David J. Fox, Directors Tackle Studios, Media Giants Over Creative Rights, L.A. TIMES, 
July 3, 1990, at 3, pt. F. 
61 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988). 
62 See STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE PROTECTION, supra note 57. 
63 [d. 
64 /d. 
406 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XV, No.2 
States has indicated that it would consider changing its system, 
but only in another multilateral forum outside the GATT.65 
In the trademark area, the EC seeks protection for "appella-
tions of origin" as trademarks subject to protection.66 Such ap-
pellations include "champagne," "burgundy," and "chablis." The 
U.S. wine industry contends that it would be harmed by rules 
requiring it to cease using these names. The United States main-
tains that it is unwilling to roll back the use of these terms, which 
it considers to be generic. 67 
5. Free Trade in Services 
The services negotiations between the EC and the United States 
have been marked less by disagreement than by a common en-
deavor to define the scope and goals of the negotiations. Services, 
including such areas as financial services, insurance, tourism, and 
telecommunications, were included for the first time in the 
Uruguay Round. This was done largely as a result of pressure by 
the United States, with somewhat less interest on the part of the 
EC. 
The main areas of negotiation have been threshold matters, 
such as defining the scope and structure of any agreement. An 
additional major area of difficulty has been how to include cross-
border movement of labor, which is essential to free trade in 
services. A relatively minor disagreement between the EC and 
the United States occurred in the negotiations on audio-visual 
services. The EC advocated a general exception to free trade in 
services for protection of "cultural values."68 The United States 
opposed such an exception on the grounds that cultural identity 
is not capable of definition given multinational television and 
movie distribution. 
More recently, the U.S. financial services industry sought to 
include a provision in the services agreement allowing for a de-
rogation from application of the agreement on a most-favored-
65 There are existing international agreements outside GATT administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization. See Convention Establishing the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization, July 19, 1967,21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 
U.N.T.S.3. 
66 Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Group 
of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Mar. 29, 1990, art. 20(2) (on file with authors). 
67 See 55 Fed. Reg. 17,961 (1990) (making it possible to obtain generic status). 
68 See Ways & Means Staff Warns, supra note 48, at 3. 
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nation basis. This derogation would apply to countries that fail 
to follow through on commitments to ease market access restric-
tions on a sectoral basis. Countries that do not remove market 
access restrictions would not continue to benefit from the multi-
lateral services agreement, according to the U.S. industry pro-
posal.69 The EC position has been similar to that of the United 
States but would allow for an interim period for compliance. 7o 
6. Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment 
The Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) negotiations 
are also a new issue in GATT. These negotiations are intended 
to reduce the restrictions on direct foreign investment maintained 
largely by the developing countries.'1 The issue has come to the 
fore as a consequence of dramatic changes in the international 
investment picture, resulting from such factors as the developing 
country debt crisis, the growth of practices linking investment to 
trade, the globalization of production, and the new-found in-
vestment potential in Russia and eastern Europe. 
The United States set out a list of fourteen investment restric-
tions for negotiation, including local content requirements, ex-
port performance requirements, and technology transfer require-
ments.72 The EC, for the most part, agreed that these measures 
should be the subject of negotiation.73 In the TRIMs talks, the 
EC-U.S. relationship is primarily one of agreement, because both 
are capital exporting parties with similar interests. 
B. Bilateral Issues 
While the Uruguay Round has been the most important forum 
for discussing EC-U.S. trade issues during the past eighteen 
months, the two governments also have attempted to resolve 
dozens of bilateral trade disputes and trade issues raised by both 
sides. In some cases, discussion of these bilateral issues has been 
related to the GATT negotiations, such as efforts to reduce avia-
69 See Financial Services Industry Pressing for More U.S. Leverage in GAIT Talks, 10 Inside 
U.S. Trade No.4, at I (Jan. 24, 1992). 
70 Id. 
7I See generally William Dullforce, Splits remain on an end to investment flow curbs, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1990, at 8. 
72 See Schott, supra note 41, at 152. 
73 See Trims Negotiating Group Completes Report to Present to Trade Negotiations Committee, 
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1112 (July 18, 1990). 
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tion and steel subsidies and to open public procurement in the 
telecommunications sector. Many of the disputes have involved 
allegations that regulatory requirements which ostensibly apply 
equally to domestic and imported products in fact have a discrim-
inatory impact on imports. This section describes some of the 
most significant bilateral issues considered in 1991 and early 
1992. 
1. Bilateral Issues Pursued by the United States 
Several of the most important bilateral issues the United States 
has pursued have involved aspects of the European Community's 
Single Market Program launched in 1986.74 Only a few years ago 
this effort to create a single economic market by developing 
Community-wide regulatory requirements represented the major 
target of U.S. government and business complaints about EC 
trade policies.75 United States concerns about the creation of a 
"Fortress Europe" in which newly unified rules would favor Eu-
ropean companies over U.S. interests were an important element 
in bilateral discussions. 76 This concern led the Department of 
Commerce to create an active "EC 1992 Division" within the 
Office of European Community Affairs which continues to co-
ordinate a number of task forces and provides information on 
Single Market Program developments. 
Concern in the United States about the program has eased 
substantially over the past two years. During that time, U.S. com-
panies began to understand more clearly the aims of European 
integration and watched the implementation of new rules, which 
only infrequently posed a threat to their operations. Most impor-
tantly, the fears of U.S. companies have been eased by their 
success in the European market. Since the Single Market Program 
was launched, U.S. exports to the EC have nearly doubled.77 Since 
late 1989, the Single Market increasingly has been perceived in 
74 Single European Act, 19870.]. (L 169) l. For a discussion of the provisions of the 
SEA, see generally Aaron Schildhaus, 1992 and the Single European Market, 27 INT'L LAW. 
549 (1989). 
75 See generally Blanca Reimer et aI., Laying the Foundation for a Great Wall of Europe, 
Bus. WK., Aug. I, 1988, at 40; Reshaping Europe: 1992 and Beyond, Bus. WK., Dec. 12, 
1988, at 48. 
76 Robert D. Hormats, A 'Fortress Europe' in 1992?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1988, at 19. 
77 See Secretary Mosbacher Reports to Business on EC 1992, Bus. AMER., Feb. 25, 1991, at 
3 (U .S. Department of Commerce Publication). 
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the V nited States as providing new opportunities to do business 
in Europe. Despite this perception, however, some V.S. business 
interests have concluded that it will be years before V.S. compa-
nies derive the full benefits of EC unification.78 
Nonetheless, Single Market initiatives continue to be of signif-
icant interest to the V.S. government and business community 
because of their potential to restrict V.S. exports and business 
operations in Europe. As discussed below, the broadcasting di-
rective, the auto import arrangement with Japan, the develop-
ment of new product standards, regulation of the distilled spirits 
and wine industries, and public procurement in the telecommu-
nications sector illustrate the nature of V.S. concern. 
In addition to those EC-V .S. issues arising out of the Single 
Market Program, numerous other issues were addressed through 
bilateral negotiations during 1991 and the beginning of 1992. 
Efforts to reduce Community subsidies provided several of the 
highest profile issues, including the Airbus, steel, and oilseeds 
negotiations. Vnited States concern about the discriminatory im-
pact of EC technical standards prompted the meat plant certifi-
cation and corn gluten feed disputes. Finally, the ongoing issue 
of V.S. corn and sorghum imports into the Community, resulting 
from the accession of Spain and Portugal, continued to receive 
attention. 
a. EC Broadcasting Directive 
The most publicized dispute concerning the Single Market Plan 
has involved the EC's "broadcasting directive," intended to create 
a single European broadcasting market. The directive, approved 
in October 1989, established a target under which European 
broadcasters must attempt to reserve over 50 percent of their 
broadcasting time for productions of European origin.79 Member 
States were required to translate the directive into national law 
by October 1991, although some countries have not met the 
deadline.80 
78 See U.S., EC Trade Friction Likely to Rise Even As 'EC 1992' Creates Opportunities, Daily 
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 243, at A-7, A-8 (Dec. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Trade Friction 
Likely to Rise]. 
79 Council Directive 89/552, 1989 OJ. (L 298) 23. 
80 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT 
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 69 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 
REPORT]. 
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At the urging of the U.S. television and film industry, the U.S. 
government repeatedly has expressed its strong opposition to the 
proposal. It contends that the directive represents a local content 
rule in violation of the GATT.81 The EC argues that broadcasting, 
as a service, is not covered by GATT obligations, and that pref-
erences based on cultural objectives are widely accepted under 
international agreements. 
Despite dozens of discussions since 1989 involving senior U.S. 
and EC officials, this dispute has not been resolved. Two rounds 
of consultations were conducted in Geneva in December 1989 
and July 1990. In April 1991, the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) placed the Community on the priority 
watch list under the Special 301 intellectual property provisions 
of the 1988 Trade Act.82 
b. Restrictions on Japanese Automobile Imports 
As part of its Single Market Program the EC has committed to 
eliminating, after 1992, quotas on automobile imports imposed 
by several Member States.83 Concerned, however, that Japanese 
producers would quickly dominate the European market, the 
Commission of the European Communities (Commission), the 
EC's executive branch,84 sought a "voluntary" transitional ar-
rangement with Japan. Specifically, the EC sought to limit the 
sale in Europe of Japanese nameplate automobiles for several 
years to give European producers time to become more compet-
itive. Throughout 1990 and 1991, the Community and Japan 
engaged in secret negotiations, and on July 31, 1991 finally 
agreed to limit Japanese automobiles to 16 percent of the market 
through 1999.85 This agreement has not been made public. While 
81 Id. 
82 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Shee~'SPecial 30/" On 
Intellectual Property, Apr. 26, 1991, at 3 (on file with authors) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
83 See Cars: Consensus on External Trade, Hesitation on Internal Aspects, Eur. Rep. (European 
Information Service) No. 1668, at 5 (Apr. 13, 1991). 
84 See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
85 See Statement by Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities and Statement by Eiichi Nakao, Minister of International Trade and 
Industry, Tokyo (reprinted in EC-JapanICars: The Agreement on the Transitional Period Has 
Been Formally Accepted by Both Parties, Europe (Agence Europe) No. 5547, at 6 (Aug. 2, 
1991); see also Cars: EEC-Japan Deal in Retrospect, Eur. Rep. (European Information Service) 
No. 1700, at 4-5 (Sept. 4, 1991); Cars: Official Versus Unofficial Quotas, Eur. Rep. (European 
Information Service) No. 1738, at 8 (jan. 25, 1992) (discussing "unofficial quotas"); Cars: 
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the EC's arrangement with Japan did not directly involve the 
United States, U.S. officials repeatedly sought assurances that 
autos produced in the United States by Japanese companies 
would not be affected. The final EC-Japan agreement reportedly 
does not limit the sale of such automobiles. In mid-February 
1992, a senior Community official asked that the auto agreement 
be reviewed to clarify the treatment of autos made in Japanese 
assembly plants located in the Community. It appeared unlikely, 
however, that any review would result in changed treatment of 
autos produced in the United States.86 
c. Product Standards 
European product standards and certification rules which the 
Community is developing have generated concerns in the United 
States that the new European rules could become an obstacle to 
U.S. sales.87 As part of its Single Market Plan, the Community is 
creating harmonized European-wide standards to replace the dif-
fering national standards of the twelve Member States in a num-
ber of areas.88 This harmonization is focusing primarily on the 
health and safety aspects of products. Eleven directives have been 
approved covering such items as machinery, construction prod-
ucts, protective equipment, medical devices, and toYS.89 Plans are 
being made for ten additional directives covering such fields as 
recreational craft and used machinery. These directives list the 
"essential requirements" for products and contract the task of 
writing specific standards to three European standards organi-
zations. The organizations and the Commission have stated their 
intention to adopt international standards when possible.90 In 
addition to these specific directives, the Commission has issued 
Renewed Controversy Around EEClJapan Agreement, Eur. Rep. (European Information Ser-
vice) No. 1742, at 8 (Feb. 8, 1992) (describing new threats to auto accord). 
86 See Cars: Portugal Wants EEClJapan Agreement Reviewed, Eur. Rep. (European Infor-
mation Service) No. 1746, at 13 (Feb. 22, 1992). 
87 See Trade Friction Likely to Rise, supra note 78, at A-7-A-8. 
88 See Sara E. Hagigh, Hundreds of New Product Standards Will Apply to Sales in EC After 
1992, Bus. AMER., Jan. 13, 1992, at 16 (U.S. Department of Commerce Publication). 
89 Europe 1992, supra note 13, at 29 (lists product, date implemented, and current 
status); see Hagigh, supra note 88, at 16. 
90 See Glennon J. Harrison, European Community: 1992 Plan for Economic Integration 
(Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, Nov. 6, 1991); Hagigh, supra note 88, at 18. 
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broader framework directives on product safety,9l worker 
safety,92 and product liability.93 
United States manufacturers generally believe that the stan-
dards changes will make it easier for them to sell in Europe. 
United States companies and the U.S. government, however, re-
peatedly have raised concerns that access to the standards-setting 
process is necessary to ensure that new standards do not inad-
vertently limit the availability of U.S. products.94 The U.S. gov-
ernment and some U.S. industries have requested observer status 
in the standards organizations, but these requests have been re-
jected.95 
The EC-U.S. dialogue on standards issues has been reinforced 
at the political level. A roundtable between European and U.S. 
standards bodies chaired by Vice President Bangemann and U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher on June 21, 1991 
resulted in an agreement to take measures to promote the use of 
international standards, and launched negotiations on mutual 
recognition agreements for testing and certification.96 This re-
sponded both to U.S. concerns and EC complaints that the United 
States often uses its own national standards instead of interna-
tional standards. By February 1992, little progress had been made 
in subsequent talks because of a split within the U.S. standards 
community and opposition from European standards organiza-
tions. 
d. Distilled Spirits 
An EC regulation implemented on March 31, 1991 created 
potential obstacles for the continued marketing of U.S. Bourbon, 
Tennessee and Blended Whiskeys, and other distilled spirits in 
the Community.97 The regulation, which was fully implemented 
on March 31, 1991, established minimum alcohol strengths, stip-
ulations regarding quality, rules on geographic designations, and 
91 Amended Proposal for a Council Directive, 1990 O.J. (C 156) 8. 
92 Council Directive 89/391, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1. 
95 Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 34. 
94 See The Effects of Greater Economic Integration Within the European Community 
on the United States, USITC Pub. 2204, at 6-7 (July 1989). 
95 Hagigh, supra note 88, at 18. 
96 See News Conference with Martin Bangemann, Vice President of the Commission 
of the European Community, Reuter Transcript Rep. (June 21, 1991). 
97 See Council Regulation 1576/89, 1989 O.J. (L 160) 1. 
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a system to verify authenticity.98 The regulation primarily af-
firmed the standards that individual Member States had long 
required. The V.S. industry, however, was concerned that V.S. 
products would no longer be permitted on the EC market, af-
fecting about $40 million in V.S. distilled spirits.99 The EC con-
tends that the three brands of V.S. whiskey may still be sold on 
the EC market, but may not carry their generic name "whiskey." 
The V.S. government is now seeking an exception from the rules 
for blended whiskey produced in the Vnited States. 
e. Wine 
Similar problems arose for the V.S. wine industry in 1990 when 
the EC adopted a regulation harmonizing the twelve existing 
national standards for procedures permitted in the laboratory 
testing of wine. 100 Because these requirements are different than 
V.S. regulations, the V.S. government is trying to extend a prior 
EC-V.S. Wine Accord which has the effect of exempting V.S. 
wines from certain European rules. 101 An extension through 
April 30, 1992 was reached, but the V.S. government was press-
ing for a long-term solution.102 
Problems also have arisen for the EC wine industry following 
the V.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) adoption of a 
standard for lead content in imported wine on September 11, 
1991.103 The FDA rule would limit lead in wine to 300 parts per 
billion of wine. I04 Although that level currently poses no threat 
to European producers, V.S. officials have stated that they intend 
to propose a stiffer limit of as little as 150 parts per billion, which 
would impact European wines.105 
98 Id. 
99 See New EC Liquor Definition Regulations Will Halt U.S. Blended Whiskey Exports, 8 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. II, at 391 (Mar. 13, 1991). 
100 Commission Regulation 2676/90, 1990 0.]. (L 272) l. 
101 See Council Decision 80/272, 1980 OJ. (L 71) 129. 
102 See EECIUS: Council Extends Wine Trade Derogation, Eur. Rep. (European Information 
Service) No. 1748, at 4 (Feb. 29, 1992). 
10. See U.S. Restrictions on Lead Content in Wine Could Cause Negotiating Problems for EC, 
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1328 (Sept. 11, 1991). 
104 E.S. Browning, Europeans Troubled by U.S. Plan to Limit Amount of Lead Allowed in 
Imported Wines, WALL ST.]' EUR., Sept. 11, 1991, at 3. 
105 Id. 
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f. Public Procurement in Telecommunications 
Both the United States and the EC have raised complaints 
about access to the other's market for telecommunications net-
work equipment, such as switching and transmission equipment 
and cables. The United States contends that telecommunications 
administrations in most EC countries procure all network equip-
ment from domestic national suppliers and that an EC govern-
ment procurement directive scheduled to take effect in January 
1993 will discriminate against U.S. suppliers. I06 The Community 
responds that the new directive will liberalize European procure-
ment of telecommunications equipment. The major EC com-
plaints are that the U.S. market is closed to European suppliers 
because AT&T purchases all of its equipment from its own man-
ufacturing arm and sales to Bell Operating Companies are limited 
for foreign suppliers. I07 
Since 1986, USTR and the Commission have conducted a series 
of bilateral "fact finding" discussions on the telecommunications 
issues. In 1989, USTR identified the EC as a "priority country" 
under Section 137 4(a) of the 1988 Trade Act, which requires the 
United States to negotiate with the objective of reaching a bilateral 
telecommunications trade agreement. lOS The EC initially refused 
to negotiate bilaterally, arguing that telecommunications issues 
should be addressed multilaterally as part of the Uruguay Round. 
Nevertheless, the EC did finally agree to enter into informal talks 
on the subject. 109 Although these talks have not resolved the 
dispute, on February 21, 1992, the United States, under the 1988 
Trade Act, extended the negotiating period until January 1, 
1993, in order to postpone retaliation required by the Act. 110 
In late February, U.S. officials nonetheless threatened to apply 
unilateral retaliatory measures if the EC did not meet U.S. de-
mands. lll EC officials dismissed the U.S. statements as attempts 
106 Council Directive 90/531,1990 O.J. (L 297) 1; see U.S., EC Divided Over Procurement, 
Seek Progress on Telecom, 9 Inside U.S. Trade No. 20, at 9-10 (May 17, 1991) [hereinafter 
U.S., EC Divided Over Public Procurement]. 
107 U.S., EC Divided Over Public Procurement, sufrra note 106, at 9-10. 
108 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1374(a), 
102 Stat. 1107, 1217-1218 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3103 (West Supp. 1991». 
109 See U.S., EC Divided Over Public Procurement, sUfrra note 106, at 9. 
110 See U.S. Floats Proposal to Break Deadlock in Telecom Talks with EC, 10 Inside U.S. 
Trade No.9, at 1 (Feb. 28, 1992) [hereinafter U.S. Floats Proposal]. 
III South Korea Agrees to Open Telephone Market to U.S., WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 24, 1992, 
at 2. 
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to gain negotiating leverage. ll2 In March, the negotiations were 
scheduled to continue, with the hope of reaching agreement 
during 1992.113 
g. Airbus 
Aside from the agricultural issues being considered in the 
GATT talks, the EC-U.S. trade dispute with the highest profile 
has been the controversy over alleged subsidies provided to the 
Airbus consortium by four Member States. The United States has 
long alleged that the Community has unfairly assisted Airbus in 
competing with U.S. aircraft producers by a variety of subsidies 
for aircraft development. 1l4 In 1990, complaints about an ex-
change rate guarantee provided by the German government com-
pounded these allegations. ll5 In response, the EC argues that the 
U.S. aircraft industry is equally subsidized through government 
contracts with the Departments of Defense and Transportation 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.ll6 Dur-
ing negotiations, the Community has proposed to curb such in-
direct subsidies. ll7 
Discussions in 1987, 1988, and 1990 under the auspices of the 
GATT Aircraft Code and additional bilateral negotiations failed 
to resolve the issue. This led the United States to request the 
creation of a panel under the GATT Subsidies Code in February 
1991.118 The U.S. request was targeted solely at the German 
exchange rate guarantee, and did not address the broader de-
velopmental subsidies. Despite EC complaints that the case should 
be considered under the GATT Code on Trade in Civil Aircraft, 
which would have made an affirmative finding less likely, the 
112 U.S. Threat of Sanctions Draws Angry EC Reaction, WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 25, 1992, 
at 3. 
113 U.S. Floats Proposal, supra note 110, at 1, 15. 
114 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1989 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REpORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 64 (1989). 
115 U.S., EC Exchange Draft Agreements to Advance Airbus Subsidy Talks, 8 Inside U.S. 
Trade No. 26, at 1, 12 (June 29, 1990). 
116 See EC Alleges "Amazing" U.S. Support Benefits Civil Aircraft Sector, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No. 49, at 1808 (Dec. 11, 1991). 
117 Farren Warns U.S. Will Fight Airbus Subsidies in GATT After a March 31 Deadline, 10 
Inside U.S. Trade No.9, at 10 (Feb. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Farren Warns). 
118 See U.S. Files Formal Complaint with GATT Over German Subsidies for Airbus Industries, 
8 Infl Trade Rep. (BNA) No.8, at 263 (Feb. 20, 1991). 
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panel ruled in favor of the United States in January 1992.119 This 
decision nonetheless leaves the broader dispute unresolved. Se-
rious efforts began in February to reach a more comprehensive 
solution, with the U.S. industry threatening to initiate a Section 
301 or a countervailing duty case if substantial progress was not 
made by March 31, 1992.120 
h. Steel Subsidies and Import Restrictions 
While the issue of reforming the world steel import and subsidy 
regime is, strictly speaking, not a bilateral issue, the United States 
and the EC have been the dominant participants in the two-year 
effort to replace the complex network of bilateral steel agree-
ments between all the significant steel-producing nations with a 
single international steel code. Negotiations to create a Multilat-
eral Steel Agreement (MSA)121 began in 1990 after the United 
States committed to end its system of bilateral voluntary restraint 
agreements (VRAs) after April 1992. The EC also agreed to 
eliminate its remaining quotas on imports from third countries 
in 1992.122 
While these issues are related to the GATT subsidy negotia-
tions, consideration of an MSA has proceeded independently of 
the Uruguay Round talks. Several negotiating sessions were con-
ducted in 1991 and early 1992, and in late February 1992, ne-
gotiators hoped to present a new draft MSA at a March negoti-
ating session. It remained unclear, however, whether an 
agreement would be reached. Among the most important issues 
under discussion were whether the agreement would limit the 
ability of producers to file antidumping cases against low-priced 
imports, whether countervailing duty cases could be filed against 
past subsidies, and what types of subsidy programs would be 
permitted to continue under the new regime. 123 
119 See Panel Decides German Payments to Airbus Consortium Contravene GAIT, Sources Say, 
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 1 (Jan. 17, 1992). 
120 See Farren Warns, supra note 117, at 1; see also U.S. EC Set Deadline in Airbus Subsidy 
Row Talks, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at 7; U.S., EC Seek to Bridge Gap Over Subsidies for 
Civil Aviation, 10 Inside u.s. Trade No.5, at 21 (Jan. 31, 1992). 
121 See Multilateral Agreement on Steel Trade Liberalization, Sixth Revision, July 27, 
1991 (on file with authors). 
122 See Steel: Slow Progress Towards Multilateral Trade Pact, Eur. Rep. (European Infor-
mation Service) No. 1739, at 3 (Jan. 29, 1992). 
123 Id.; see also Specialty Steel Industry Launches Drive for Three-Year Extension of VRAs, 10 
Inside U.S. Trade No.8, at 1 (Feb. 21, 1992); Quadrilateral Negotiations to Work Out Final 
Deal on Steel Accord, 10 Inside U.S. Trade No.9, at S-1 (Feb. 28, 1992). 
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1. Meat Plant Inspection and Certification 
Legislation the Community enacted in 1972-known as the 
third country meat directive l24-permits fresh meat to be im-
ported into the EC only when livestock have been slaughtered 
and packed in plants meeting strict EC hygiene standards. Using 
this authority, the EC decertified U.S. meat plants, prohibiting 
meat processed in those plants from being imported into the 
EC.125 The United States complained that this legislation discrim-
inated against U.S. exporters because the inspection requirements 
for U.S. meat exports are not the same as those for meat pro-
duced and consumed in individual Member States. United States 
meat producers also alleged that the ban was not based on legit-
imate food safety concerns, but rather was "an artificial trade 
barrier."126 The EC responded that U.S. authorities had not 
shown a commitment to addressing Community concerns about 
U.S. meat processing procedures and that action was necessary 
to protect the health of European consumers.127 
After bilateral negotiations failed in November 1990, the 
United States initiated a Section 301 investigation in January 
1991.128 The dispute appeared to have been settled in May 1991 
when U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan and EC 
Agriculture Commissioner Ray MacSharry agreed to a two-phase 
plan to establish equivalent sanitary rules by the end of 1991.129 
The United States, however, again became concerned when dif-
ficulties were reported in the application of EC inspection pro-
cedures in U.S. meat plants meeting EC standards. Thus, on July 
11, 1991, the United States requested the establishment of a 
124 Council Directive 72/462, 19870.]. (L 34) 52. 
125 See Two Industry Groups File Section 301 Case Over EC Ban of Pork, Beef Products, 8 
Inside U.S. Trade No. 48, at 5 (Nov. 30, 1990); see also 1991 FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 
REPORT, supra note 80, at 75. 
126 See EC Bans Imports of u.s. Pork Products Citing Unsatisfactory 'Slaughter Hygierle,' Daily 
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 212, at A-II (Nov. 1, 1990); see also Initiation of Section 
302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: European Community Third Country 
Meat Directive, 56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (1991). 
127 See Letter from Ray MacSharry, EC Agriculture Minister, to Clayton Yeutter, U.S. 
Secretary of Agriculture (reprinted in 8 Inside U.S. Trade No. 43, at 6 (Oct. 26, 1990». 
128 Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: European 
Community Third Country Meat Directive, 56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (1991); see Hills Accepts 
Section 301 Case on EC Pork, Beef Ban, But Seeks Informal Solution, 9 Inside U.S. Trade No. 
2, at 4 (Jan. 11, 1991). 
12. See EEC/U.S.: EEC Lifts Ban on Horsemeat, Eur. Rep. (European Information Service) 
No. 1674, at 7 (May 4, 1991). 
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GATT dispute settlement panel. 130 The EC responded on Sep-
tember 24, 1991 with a compromise proposal which appears to 
have settled the dispute. Fourteen of the twenty-five U.S. plants 
originally decertified were approved 131 and the United States 
received assurances regarding future certification activities. 132 
J. Oilseeds 
The ongoing dispute over Community subsidies to its oilseeds 
industry remained unresolved in February 1992. United States 
producers of oilseeds-which include soybeans, sunflower seeds, 
and rape-seeds-have claimed that the subsidies cost them an 
estimated $2 billion in worldwide sales133 and violate the GATT 
for two reasons. First, U.S. producers argue that the subsidies 
make U.S. oilseeds uncompetitive in European markets despite 
the EC's zero-bound tariffs on oilseeds. As a result, the benefits 
of the zero-bound duty are nullified, in contravention of the 
GATT. Second, the United States alleges that the subsidies violate 
the GATT's "national treatment" provision, because subsidies are 
provided only to EC oilseed processors. 134 
Although the oilseed issue could be discussed in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations on agricultural subsidies, the EC has agreed 
to settle the dispute bilaterally because it affects primarily U.S. 
farmers. In January 1990, a GATT panel which had been estab-
lished at the request of the United States ruled that the oilseeds 
regime was inconsistent with the GATT on both grounds the 
United States had argued. 135 In response to the ruling, EC Ex-
130 See EECIGA7T: us Lodges Complaint Against EEC Meat Plant Directive, Eur. Rep. 
(European Information Service) No. 1693, at 8 (July 13, 1991). 
131 Council Decision 911522, 1991 O.J. (L 283) 14; see also EECIUS: Meat Plant Dispute 
Defwed, Eur. Rep. (European Information Service) No. 1708, at 1-2 (Oct. 2,1991). 
"2 See EC Farm Ministers Relist Three U.S. Slaughterhowes, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 
38, at 1394 (Sept. 25, 1991); see also EECIUS: Meat Plant Dispute Defwed, supra note 131, 
at 1-2. 
". See EC Commissioner Andriessen Sends Mixed Signals on Oilseeds Dispute, 9 Inside U.S. 
Trade No. 29, at 10 (July 19, 1991). 
". See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Determinations Under Section 304 of 
the Trade Act of 1974-European Community's Policies and Practices with Respect to 
Inter Alia, Production and Processing Subsidies on Oilseeds and Determination Under 
Section 305 to Delay Implementation of Any Action Taken Pursuant to Section 301 (Jan. 
30, 1990); see also USTR Release, Determinations Under Section 304 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
as amended; Petition filed on behalf of U.S. oilseed producers (available at USTR Public 
Records Room). 
U5 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supp. No. 37, at 86 (Jan. 25, 
1990). 
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ternal Affairs Commissioner Frans Andriessen and Agriculture 
Commissioner MacSharry indicated that the EC would adopt a 
new oilseeds regime by the end of October 1991 which would 
bring Community legislation into conformity with the conclusions 
of the GATT panel. 136 
On July 31, 1991, the Commission proposed a new support 
scheme intended to meet this commitment .beginning with the 
1992 harvest. 137 Neither the United States nor the EC Member 
States, however, were satisfied with the proposals; the United 
States believed they were insufficient and the EC believed they 
went too far. Thus, the United States requested the convening of 
a GATT panel. 138 The Community rejected this request, which 
led the United States to threaten unilateral retaliation mea-
sures. 139 At the end of 1991 the Commission produced an 
amended oil seeds proposal which both the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament accepted. 140 United States officials 
argued, however, that while the proposal resolved the national 
treatment issue, it continued to maintain excessively high subsidy 
levels. 141 In January 1992, the United States again requested that 
a new GATT dispute panel be convened to rule on the new 
oil seeds regime. 142 
136 See Letter from Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities and Ray MacSharry, EC Agriculture Minister, to Carla Hills, U.S. 
Trade Representative and Edward R. Madigan, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture (June 27, 
1991) (reprinted in 9 Inside U.S. Trade No. 29, at 11 (July 19, 1991» . 
.., See ECIAgriculture: The Commission Adopts its Proposal of a New Subsidy System to Producers 
ofOilseeds Compatible with GATT Regulations, Europe (Agence Europe) No. 5547, at 5 (Aug. 
2, 1991). 
138 See Letter from Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative and Edward R. Madigan, 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, to Frans Andriessen, Vice President of the Commission of 
the European Communities and Ray MacSharry, EC Agriculture Minister (Sept. 9, 1991) 
(reprinted in 9 Inside U.S. Trade 37, at 10 (Sept. 13, 1991»; see also ECIAgriculture: The 
United States Criticises the EC Plan to Revise the Subsidy System to Producers of Oil-Producing 
Plants and Calls for the GATT Soya Panel to be Convened Once More, Europe (Agence Europe) 
No. 5585, at 10 (Oct. 10, 1991). 
139 See U.S. Preparing to Retaliate Against EC Over Subsidies for Oilseed Production, 8 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 562 (Apr. 17, 1992). 
140 See European Parliament Okays Commission Proposal to Reform Oilseed Subsidies, 8 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1815 (Dec. 11, 1991). 
141 See GATT: US Complains to Council About EEC Oilseeds Reform Plan, Eur. Rep. (Eu-
ropean Information Service) No. 1721, at 3 (Nov. 16, 1991); see also U.S. Warns EC on 
Failure to Implement Oilseeds Ruling, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1656 (Nov. 13, 
1991). 
142 See GATT Investigative Panel to Reopen Hearings on EC Oilseed Subsidies, 9 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No.5, at 191 (Jan. 29, 1992) [hereinafter GATT Investigative Panel]. To 
further complicate the dispute, the Community has proposed raising the zero-level tariff 
420 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV, No.2 
k. Corn Gluten Feed 
In 1991, the V nited States and the EC successfully resolved a 
technical dispute which had blocked imports of V.S. corn gluten 
feed, an animal feed, into the Community. This long-standing 
problem dating back to the 1970s came to the fore again in May 
1991. Dutch customs officials blocked a 200,000 ton shipment 
from the V nited States, claiming that more than 20 percent of 
the feed consisted of other residue-in this case corn germ meal, 
a by-product in the processing of corn gluten feed. 143 Though 
both products can enter duty-free into the EC if imported sepa-
rately, the Community charges a $200 per ton fee for the mixture, 
which has the effect of a 600 percent duty.144 
Negotiations, some at the ministerial level, continued through-
out the summer of 1991 within the Community, bilaterally be-
tween the EC and the V nited States, and under the auspices of 
the GATT. On September 25, 1991, the EC agreed to a V.S. 
proposal to take effect on January 1, 1992 which ensured the 
duty free entry into the EC of V.S. corn gluten containing no 
more than 4.5 percent extractable fat.145 The agreement also 
provides for the repayment of duties levied since January 1, 1991 
on corn gluten meeting the new definition and establishes a cer-
tification program. 
l. Corn and Sorghum 
In 1987, the EC reached an agreement with the Vnited States 
setting specific levels for imports of V.S. maize and sorghum into 
Spain through 1990 and reducing Spanish tariffs on imports of 
on imported oilseeds to offset reductions in other agricultural tariffs in the Uruguay 
Round market access negotiations. Virtually all other GATT members opposed this 
"rebalancing" proposal. See Barbara Casassus, US Is 'Playing With Fire' On Oilseeds, EC 
Official Says, J. COM., Jan. 31, 1992, at 6A; see also GATT Investigative Panel to Reopen 
Hearings on EC Oilseeds Subsidies, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 18, at A-6 (Jan. 
28, 1992). 
143 See EEC/US: Com Gluten Feed Shipments Refused at Dutch Port, Eur. Rep. (European 
Information Service) No. 1768, at 3 (May 23, 1991); see also EEC/US: Com Gluten Feed 
Dispute Causes Outrage in France, Eur. Rep. (European Information Service) No. 1697, at 
7 (July 27, 1991). 
144 See EC Commission Sources Say 200,000 Tons of u.s. Com Gluten Blocked in Rotterdam, 
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 824 (May 29, 1991); EEC/US: Com Gluten Feed 
Shipments Refused at Dutch Port, supra note 143, at 3-4. 
145 See EC, U.S. Settle Com Dispute, Move on to Short-Term Accord on Meat Ban, 9 Inside 
U.S. Trade No. 39, at I (Sept. 27, 1991). 
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approximately twenty-five U.S. products. 146 This agreement was 
adopted in the context of the accession of Spain and Portugal 
into the Community in 1986 to compensate the United States for 
the elimination of other trade concessions which Spain and Por-
tugal previously had granted to the United States. Following 
negotiations between Commissioner MacSharry and Secretary of 
Agriculture Clayton Yeutter in December 1990, the EC agreed 
to extend the agreement for one year until December 31, 1991, 
and agreed to seek a permanent solution by September 1991. 147 
While such a long-term resolution was not reached in 1991, the 
EC again extended the agreement into 1992.148 
m. Shipbuilding Subsidies 
The U.S. shipbuilding industry has long complained about 
subsidies the Community allegedly provides to its shipbuilding 
and repair industries. These include subsidized export credits, 
direct subsidies, restricted procurement practices, tax benefits, 
and infusions of equity. 149 In 1989, the Shipbuilders Council of 
America filed a Section 301 petition seeking elimination of these 
practices, but withdrew the petition later in the year based on 
U.S. and EC commitments to conduct multilateral negotiations 
under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD).150 These talks began in October 
1989. 
Two years of negotiations have thus far failed to result in a 
multilateral resolution, primarily because of Japanese opposition. 
In early 1992, the chairman of the OECD working group was 
attempting to prepare a draft agreement which could overcome 
these obstacles. The United States and the Community, however, 
appeared to be making progress toward a bilateral understanding 
on shipbuilding subsidies. 151 During those talks, the EC raised 
146 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1987 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE RE-
PORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 95 (1987). 
147 Yeutter 'More Optimistic' on Uruguay Round Following Meeting with EC's Farm Minister, 
7 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at !913 (Dec. 19, 1990). 
148 See EC Council of Ministers Approves Extension of Corn Export Accord Under U.S. Through 
1991,8 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) No. I, at 5 (Jan. 2,1991). 
149 1991 FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 80, at 79. 
150 1d. 
151 New Shipbuilding Draft Agreement Aims at Resurrecting Stalled Talks, 10 Inside U.S. 
Trade No.5, at 5 (Jan. 31,1992). 
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concerns about the V.S. Jones Act, which prohibits foreign-built 
vessels from engaging in V.S. coastwise trade. 152 
2. Bilateral Issues Pursued by the European Community 
While V.S. bilateral trade complaints predictably have received 
more attention in the V nited States, the Community has pursued 
a number of trade complaints against the Vnited States over the 
past eighteen months. As discussed below, several of the most 
notable disputes have involved V.S. trade procedures and fees, 
such as Section 301, V.S. regulation of foreign direct investment, 
and the V.S. customs user and harbor maintenance fees. The EC 
also has raised concerns about V.S. regulatory laws which al-
legedly have a discriminatory effect on EC producers, such as 
the "gas guzzler" tax, the corporate average fuel economy law 
for automobiles, the V.S. ban on certain tuna imports, limits on 
EC wine imports containing the fungicide procymidone, and beer 
and wine excise taxes. 
a. Unilateral U.S. Action Under Section 301 
The EC has objected strongly to V.S. unilateral retaliatory 
action and the recent expansion of this authority under V.S. law. 
In 1974, Congress enacted Section 301, authorizing V.S. unilat-
eral retaliation against unfair trade practices, defined very 
broadly.153 An example of the use of Section 301 was the V.S. 
retaliation against the EC after it refused to allow V.S. beef into 
its market pursuant to an EC directive prohibiting the use of 
certain hormones in livestock farming. 154 The Vnited States re-
taliated by raising tariffs to 100 percent on certain EC food 
products. 155 
The EC views V.S. action under Section 301 as illegal under 
GATT, which requires that measures taken against other GATT 
parties must be sanctioned by the GATT parties. In addition, the 
Community is critical of the increased scope of Section 301 re-
152 [d.; 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1920). 
153 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978,2041 (codified 
as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West Supp. 1991)). 
154 Council Directive 146/88, 1988 OJ. (L 70) 16. 
155 See REPORT ON UNITED STATES TRADE BARRIERS AND UNFAIR PRACTICES 1991, 
SERVICES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 9 [hereinafter EC TRADE 
BARRIERS REPORT]' 
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sulting from amendments to the law in 1988. 156 The 1988 amend-
ments decreased the discretion of the administering authority to 
decide not to retaliate. 157 In addition, the amendments provided 
for identification of "priority foreign countries" and "priority 
unfair trade practices"-so-called Super 30 I-with the possibility 
of U.S. retaliation as an incentive for changing the practices. 158 
In bilateral negotiations with the United States, the Community 
has emphasized the danger of unilateral action for the multilat-
eral trading system as a whole. 159 Elimination of Section 301 
authority has been an important EC objective in the Uruguay 
Round, but U.S. negotiators have expressed strong reluctance to 
make concessions. 160 A significant obstacle to change is the strong 
support for Section 301 in Congress. 
b. U.S. Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment 
Increased U.S. restrictions on direct foreign investment have 
been the subject of ongoing bilateral negotiations between the 
United States and the Community. In response, largely to several 
high-profile purchases of U.S. real estate and businesses by Jap-
anese investors, Congress enacted legislation placing restrictions 
on foreign investment. The so-called "Exon-Florio" bill enacted 
in 1 988 provides for review of foreign purchases of U.S. com-
panies and the possibility of forced divestiture if the investment 
is deemed to threaten "national security."161 
The Community has expressed concern about the vague nature 
of the term "national security" and the possibility, therefore, that 
the law could be used to prevent investment in a wide range of 
industries. 162 The vague nature of the provision would also allow 
for application of the law in a discriminatory manner, and the 
156 Id. at 8-10. 
157 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301(a), 
102 Stat. 1107,1146-76 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-19 (West Supp. 
1991)). 
158 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 
102 Stat. 1107, 1176-79 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420 (West Supp. 1991)). 
159 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 155, at 8-10. 
160 Id. 
161 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West Supp. 1989). 
162 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 155, at 80-81; see also EEC/US: Community 
Warning on Foreign Direct Investment Barriers, Eur. Rep. (European Information Service) 
No. 1745, at 9; EC/United States: While Welcoming President Bush's Orientation in Favor of 
"National Treatment" of Foreign Investments, EC Expresses Concern for Certain Aspects of Amer-
ican Legislation, Europe (Agence Europe) No. 5671, at 7 (Feb. 19, 1992). 
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Community has sought assurances that the principle of national 
treatment will be honored. 163 These concerns lead the Commis-
sion to issue a formal statement on February 19, 1992, describing 
its concerns about U.S. investment provisions and warning that 
such restrictions should not be abused by applying them for 
"protectionist reasons."164 In addition, the Community is seeking 
liberalization of U.S. investment restrictions in the shipping, tel-
ecommunications, and energy industries, where foreign owner-
ship has been restricted since the turn of the century.165 
c. User Fees 
Since 1987, the Community has objected to the U.S. customs 
user fee,166 supposedly a processing fee on imports. In 1987, the 
EC requested that GATT convene a panel to consider the issue. 167 
The GATT panel concluded that the user fee should be limited 
to the cost of services rendered. 168 In 1990, the United States 
altered the fee structure. 169 The Community, however, continues 
to object that the fee is in excess of actual processing costs because 
the fee is based on the value of the import, with no relation to 
processing costS.170 
The Community also has raised the issue of the recent three-
fold increase in the U.S. harbor maintenance fee, charged to both 
domestic users and importers. l7l The Community admits that the 
fee appears to be nominally paid by both importers and export-
ers, and therefore is not discriminatory. Nevertheless, the Com-
163 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note ISS, at 80-81. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. 
166 Customs and Trade Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C.A. § 58c (West Supp. 1991); see European 
Community Criticizes U.S. Measures at GAIT, Reuters North European Service, June 18, 
1987, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnews File. 
167 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note ISS, at 20. 
168 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supp. No. 35, at 245 (Feb. 2, 
1988). 
169 Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, § Ill, 104 Stat. 629, 635-
39 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 58c (West Supp. 1991)). Additional legislation 
enacted in October 1990 extended the alteration for four years, until September 30, 1995. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-58, § 10001(a), 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-385 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 58c(j)(3) (West Supp. 1991)). 
170 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note ISS, at 20. 
171 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11214(b), 104 
Stat. 1388, 1388-436 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 4461 (West Supp. 1991)). 
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munity believes that the ad valorem structure of the fee makes it 
illegal under GATT. 172 
d. U.S. Trade Barriers Affecting Entry of Automobiles Into the 
U.S. Market 
The so-called "gas guzzler" tax the United States imposes under 
the Internal Revenue Code,173 has been the object of criticism by 
the Community. The tax applies to all cars averaging less than 
22.5 miles per gallon. Cars imported into the United States, how-
ever, are more likely to pay a gas guzzler tax than otherwise-
comparable domestically produced cars because the fuel economy 
of the car is based on the "model type."174 Under the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation's definition of 
"model type," cars of different efficiency can be considered one 
model type, so that the fuel economy of heavier models can be 
averaged with other more fuel efficient cars which use the same 
engine and chassis. 175 Hence, the U.S. manufacturer-which typ-
ically produces several different vehicles within the same model 
type--can sell some cars which do not meet the allowable fuel 
economy level without being taxed. EC carmakers, however, typ-
ically do not include different vehicles within a single model type, 
so that averaging does not occur. 176 During 1991, the Community 
viewed the tax as an attempt by the United States to raise revenue 
in a discriminatory manner,177 although concern appeared to 
have eased in early 1992. 
The Community has leveled a similar criticism with regard to 
the U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy law (CAFE).l7B Under 
CAFE, penalties are imposed on carmakers based on a minimum 
average fuel economy level of the entire corporate fleet, currently 
27.5 miles per gallon. Because CAFE allows full-line carmakers 
to average the fuel economy of small and large cars, they are able 
to meet the standard. This structure benefits the U.S. carmakers 
who are full-line, while imposing greater constraints on the lim-
ited-line manufacturers with larger, higher-value vehicles, who 
172 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, sUfrra note 155, at 21. 
173 I.R.C. § 4064 (1988). 
174 EC TRADE BARRIERS REpORT, sUfrra note 155, at 34-36. 
175 40 C.F.R. § 600.002-85 (1991). 
176 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, sUfrra note 155, at 34-36. 
177 [d. 
178 Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2008 (1988). 
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tend to be European. Thus, the EC views the penalties as discrim-
inatory.179 
In addition, the Community contends that CAFE acts to en-
courage U.S. domestic sourcing of automobile parts. Under 
CAFE, the fuel efficiency of domestic and imported cars is cal-
culated separately. Domestic cars have 75 percent of the total 
value of the vehicle produced in the United States. As a conse-
quence, a company which sells both less efficient domestic cars 
and more efficient imported cars, can increase the average fuel 
efficiency of the domestic fleet by increasing the domestic content 
of the imported cars. The company thereby turns them into 
"domestic" cars under CAFE. 
e. U.S. Legislation Affecting Fisheries 
In 1991 and early 1992, the EC actively opposed the U.S. ban 
on tuna from Mexico and Venezuela and from countries im-
porting from Mexico or Venezuela, which include France, Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal. The U.S. law provides for imposition of an 
embargo on countries that do not meet certain standards for the 
protection of dolphins. IBo Starting in 1991, the United States 
implemented sanctions against the aforementioned countries, 
and against countries which import tuna from the countries em-
bargoed by the United States. A U.S. court has upheld the em-
bargo. IBI The embargo is primarily on tuna products, but can be 
expanded to include all fisheries products. IB2 
The Community has objected to the unilateral nature of the 
U.S. action, arguing that the issue should be resolved on a mul-
tilateral basis and that the standard for protection should not be 
decided solely by the United States. IB3 European officials have 
also stated that the overly broad scope of the sanctions are out 
of proportion with the objective of reducing dolphin mortality 
and are, therefore, in violation of GATT.IB4 
Last August, a GATT panel determined that the U.S. ban was 
illegal on the basis that the United States was, in effect, legislating 
179 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 155, at 34-37. 
180 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991). 
181 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, C 88 1380 TEH, 1992 WL 29984 (N.D. Cal.). 
182 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 155, at 14. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. 
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outside its proper jurisdiction. '8s In order for the panel decision 
to have any force, however, it must be formally adopted. Begin-
ning in February 1992, GATT members, led by the Community, 
began urging adoption of the panel decision. 186 
In early March, the GATT panel report had not been adopted 
because the original complainant, Mexico, and the United States 
had agreed to resolve the dispute. '87 Nonetheless, Mexico had 
not pursued the issue aggressively in order to avoid a confron-
tation with the United States at a sensitive time in the N AFT A 
negotiations. 188 
The U.S. administration recently made an unsuccessful effort 
to abolish the tuna ban. '89 The administration backed an amend-
ment to pending fisheries legislation, in order to overturn the 
ban. 190 The relevant committee of Congress, however, did not 
support the amendment, causing it to languish. '91 Hence, the 
controversy is unresolved to date. 
Additionally, other legislation in the fisheries conservation area 
has been the subject of EC-U.S. negotiation. The Fisheries Con-
servation Amendments of 1990 calls for the United States to enter 
into international agreements which include control measures, 
such as the right to board and inspect vessels and to have on-
board observers on driftnet fishing in U.S. waters. 192 The legis-
lation also threatens a boycott for countries found engaged in 
practices which the United States deems damaging. Again, the 
Community views this as an area for multilateral rulemaking. 
f. Procymidone Ban 
In 1990, the United States banned imports of wine from the 
EC on the ground that the wine contained a fungicide which 
185 See GAIT: EEC Urges Council to Adopt Panel Ruling on U.S. Tuna Ban, Eur. Rep. 
(European Information Service) No. 1746, at 1 (Feb. 22, 1992). 
186 See Frances Williams, GAIT Members Set to Oppose U.S. on Tuna Import Curb, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at 6. 
187 EC and 17 Other Delegations Push for Adoption of GAIT Tuna-Dolphin Panel, 10 Inside 
U.S. Trade No.8, at 1 (Feb. 21, 1992). 
188 Id. 
189 See Administration Backs Down on Amendment to Repeal Mexican Tuna Ban, 10 Inside 
U.S. Trade No.9, at 20 (Feb. 28, 1992). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Fisheries Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 107, 104 Stat. 
4436,4442 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1826(d) (West Supp. 1991». 
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might pose a health hazard. 193 Procymidone, a chemical used by 
European vineyards had been cleared for consumption by Eu-
ropean authorities. Following bilateral negotiations between the 
EC and the United States, represented by the FDA and the EPA, 
a partial solution was reached when the EPA set a temporary, 
four-year tolerance level for procymidone in grapes grown before 
January 1, 1990. 194 Although the Community welcomed this step 
insofar as it allows continued exports of pre-1990 vintages, the 
Community still points to the problems surrounding post-1990 
vintages. The Community does not believe that the alleged risks 
from procymidone are established. 
g. Beer and Wine Excise Tax 
In 1990, the United States increased dramatically excise taxes 
on beer and wine. 195 Although the Community has not objected 
directly to the increase, it has objected to the tax exemptions for 
solely "small domestic producers."196 In fact, the definition of 
"small" exempts a large portion of the U.S. wine industry.197 
According to the Community this law is a discriminatory tax in 
violation of GATT Article II1.2.198 
h. Other EC Bilateral Issues 
The Community has raised concerns about a number of other 
issues not discussed in detail in this Article. In 1989, a GATT 
dispute panel found that Section 337 of the U.S. trade law, which 
permits the United States to block entry of products infringing 
U.S. patents, violates GATT.199 The United States has yet to 
implement changes to this law, which generates ongoing EC con-
cerns. The Community also opposes Jones Act restrictions on the 
use of foreign-built vessels in U.S. coastwise trade,20o certain "Buy 
193 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note ISS, at 42-43. 
194 See EPA Action on Procymidone Clears the Way to End Ban Against European Wine Imports, 
8 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 195 (Feb. 6, 1991). 
195 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of October 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-58, §§ 11201 
(b)(I)(A)-(D), (c)(1), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-415, 1388-416 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5041, 
5051 (West Supp. 1991)). 
196 EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note ISS, at 38-39. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supp. No. 36, at 345 (Nov. 7, 
1989); see also EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note ISS, at 77. 
200 46 U.S.C. app. 883 (1988). 
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American" provisions, financial and telecommunications services 
barriers, and cargo preference laws.201 
III. STRUCTURE FOR EC-U.S. TRADE RELATIONS 
In addressing the types of trade issues described in the previous 
section, the United States and the Community must each reach 
an internal consensus on whether to pursue a particular matter 
and determine the most promising strategy and negotiating 
forum for seeking its objectives. This internal process is often as 
difficult as the ultimate negotiation. Both the United States and 
the Community have developed similar mechanisms for deter-
mining priorities and developing strategies. Both have given pri-
mary trade negotiating responsibility to a single entity within their 
governments, while maintaining involvement of other govern-
ment experts. Both have instituted interagency or inter-service 
bodies to foster consensus-building and cooperation. 
The U.S. and EC systems for developing trade policy, however, 
are different in several important respects. Most notably, the 
Community must deal with the added complexity of developing 
a consensus for its trade agenda among all twelve Member States. 
As a result, procedures designed to gain approval for negotiating 
positions from Member States are more structured in the EC 
than is coordination between the various divisions of the EC 
bureaucracy. By contrast, the most formalized trade-making ap-
paratus in the United States is aimed at coordinating the interests 
and activities of the various departments and agencies of the U.S. 
government. United States trade officials, however, face the com-
plexity of dealing with a powerful and assertive Congress which 
frequently has different objectives than the executive branch. 
Actual trade negotiations can involve officials from many levels. 
It is not unusual for a single EC-U.S. trade matter to receive the 
attention of technical experts, mid-level trade officials, senior 
trade negotiators, cabinet members, and heads of state at some 
time during the negotiation. Similarly, EC-U.S. bilateral trade 
issues may be pursued in multilateral negotiations such as GATT, 
bilateral negotiations, GATT dispute settlement proceedings, and 
through the use or threat of unilateral trade sanctions. Some 
trade disputes are considered in all of these venues. Even the 
nature of bilateral negotiations may vary widely, from official 
201 See EC TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 155, at 25, 40, 45, 66, 72. 
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sessions devoted to a specific subject to side meetings or minor 
agenda items in meetings of heads of state. The following is an 
overview of the trade policy process in both the United States 
and the EC and a description of the two governments' opportu-
nities for negotiation. 
A. EC and U.S. Competence in Trade Relations 
The President of the United States, and in some cases Congress, 
have enjoyed authority to represent the United States in its trade 
relations for over 200 years. The Constitution is viewed as giving 
the President the inherent power to negotiate treaties and inter-
national agreements and to conduct the less formalized aspects 
of international trade relations.202 The Constitution, however, 
specifically provides that Congress has the authority to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations203 and requires that the Senate 
consent to treaties.204 Thus, international agreements such as 
GATT are negotiated by executive branch officials under dele-
gated authority from Congress.205 
The authority for the Community to playa role in international 
trade matters is provided in Articles 113 and 114 of the EEC 
Treaty,206 which transfers the competence to enter into tariff and 
general trade policy negotiations with third countries from Mem-
ber States' governments to the EC. The Commission-under the 
direction of the Council and subject to the Council's approval-
represents the Community in bilateral and multilateral trade ne-
gotiations.207 
B. Key Participants in U.S. Trade Policy 
1. Executive Branch 
Over time, Congress has delegated vast authority in the inter-
national trade area to the President. In addition to emergency 
authority granted to the President, Congress has passed numer-
ous trade statutes delegating authority. The first major grant of 
202 U.S. CONST. art. II; EDMOND MCGoVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: 
GATT, THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 67, 68, 70, 79 (1986). 
203 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. 
204 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
205 For a more detailed discussion, see MCGOVERN, supra note 202, at 64-90. 
206 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]. 
207 [d.; see MCGoVERN, supra note 202, at 94-96. 
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authority occurred in 1934 when Congress delegated the nego-
tiation and implementing authority for reciprocal tariff reduc-
tion.208 Congress retained the power to renew the authority, as it 
has in subsequent delegations of negotiating authority. Further-
more, escape clause action, antidumping and countervailing duty 
legislation,209 and Section 301 complaints, among other trade 
regulations, are the responsibility of the executive branch as the 
consequence of congressional delegation of authority.210 
a. Office of the u.s. Trade Representative 
In the United States, trade issues generally are handled directly 
or coordinated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR).211 The process led by USTR often includes officials at 
the Departments of Commerce, State, Agriculture, or other de-
partments with jurisdiction over specific issues on the bilateral 
agenda. USTR is part of the Office of the President and the U.S. 
Trade Representative is a Presidential appointee who serves as a 
member of the President's cabinet.212 
A number of USTR's professionals are involved in negotiating 
EC-U.S. trade issues. The Assistant USTR for Europe and the 
Mediterranean and his staff play an important role in monitoring, 
coordinating, and negotiating European trade issues. Anyone of 
three Deputy USTRs-who are the USTR's senior appointees-
could become involved in disputes or negotiations when the issues 
are particularly political or involve the Deputy USTR's broader 
responsibilities. Similarly, various USTR industry or issue experts 
frequently handle negotiations with the EC in their areas of re-
sponsibility, such as steel or textiles. 
b. Commerce Department and Other Executive Branch Depart-
ments 
The Commerce Department also is a frequent participant in 
or leader of bilateral discussions. In addition to the Secretary of 
208 Trade Agreements Act, ch. 474, §§ 1-4, 48 Stat. 943, 943-45 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 100, 1201, 1351-54 (1988). 
209 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-77K (West Supp. 1991). 
210 See MCGOVERN, supra note 202, at 71 - 80. 
211 The USTR was created by Executive Order 11075 on January 15, 1963. Congress 
established the office as an agency of the Executive Office of the President. 19 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2171(a) (West Supp. 1991). 
212 See A Preface to Trade, Executive Office of the President, United States, Trade 
Representative 1982, at 23. 
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Commerce, European issues are sometimes handled in the Com-
merce Department by the Under Secretary for International 
Trade, the Under Secretary for Export Administration, the Of-
fice of European Community Affairs-particularly when Single 
Market initiatives are at issue-and industry and issue special-
ists.213 The Office of European Community Affairs closely mon-
itors developments of the Community. 
The State Department generally becomes involved with trade 
negotiations when broader political concerns are at issue. The 
State Department serves an important function through super-
vising the activities of the official U.S. Mission to the EC, located 
in BrusselS.214 This Mission is headed by an Ambassador and has 
a staff of EC trade and industry specialists. 
Because many EC-U.S. issues involve agricultural trade, the 
Department of Agriculture often becomes a key player in bilateral 
discussions.215 The primary participants are the Secretary, the 
Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for International Affairs 
and Commodity Programs, and other issue experts. Finally, the 
Customs Service generally takes the lead on customs issues,216 
and the Treasury Department plays a key role in investment 
issues.217 
c. Coordination Within the Executive Branch 
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the President estab-
lished an interagency trade policy mechanism to assist with the 
implementation of policy.218 This organization consists of three 
tiers of committees which constitute the principal mechanism for 
developing and coordinating U.S. positions on international 
trade. The Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) and the Trade 
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) , administered and chaired by 
USTR, are the principal subcabinet interagency trade policy co-
213 For a description of the structure of the Department of Commerce, see OFFICE OF 
THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT MANUAL 1991192 144-70 
(1991). 
214 For a description of the structure of the Department of State, see ill. at 424-37. 
215 For a description of the structure of the Department of Agriculture, see ill. at 104-
43. 
216 For a description of the structure of the Customs Service, see ill. at 492-93. 
217 For a description of structure of the Department of the Treasury, see ill. at 476-
508. 
218 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988». 
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ordination groups.219 The TPRG is staffed by members of exec-
utive branch agencies at the Under Secretary level. The TPSC is 
the first line operating group, with representation at the senior 
civil servant level.220 Supporting the TPSC are subcommittees 
responsible for specialized areas and several task forces that work 
on particular issues. Through the interagency process, USTR 
assigns responsibilities for thorough economic analysis to mem-
bers of the appropriate TPSC subcommittee or task force. Con-
clusions and recommendations of this group are then presented 
to the full TPSC and serve as the basis for reaching interagency 
consensus. If agreement is not reached in the TPSC, or if partic-
ularly significant policy questions are being considered, issues are 
handled by the TPRG.221 
The important TPRG and TPSC committees for EC trade is-
sues are the TPSC Subcommittee on Western Europe and the 
1992 Task Force. The Subcommittee on Western Europe has 
established subgroups dealing with such issues as the EC-U.S. 
citrus agreements. Beginning in 1989, the TPSC created a new 
1992 Task Force outside the committee structure. The 1992 Task 
Force operates at the TPRG level with working groups on stan-
dards, quantitative restrictions, services, and customs. 
Until February 1992, the final tier of the interagency trade 
policy mechanism was the Economic Policy Council (EPC), 
chaired by the President with the Secretary of the Treasury serv-
ing as the chairman pro tempore.222 The EPC provided Cabinet-
level review of major economic issues and was involved in many 
important trade issues, especially those issues requiring the Pres-
ident's attention. In February 1992, the President established a 
new structure, the Policy Coordinating Group (PCG), which re-
placed the EPC.223 The PCG provides a structure for developing 
219 Member agencies of the TPRG and the TPSC consist of the Departments of Com-
merce, Agriculture, State, Treasury, Labor, Justice, Defense, Interior, Transportation, 
and Energy; the Office of Management and Budget; the Council of Economic Advisors; 
the National Security Council; and the International Development Cooperation Agency. 
[d.; see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 2002, 2003. Representatives of other agencies may also be invited 
to attend meetings depending on the specific issues discussed. 
220 See Trade Policy Development (unpublished paper available from the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, Office of Public Affairs (Apr. 24, 1991». 
221 [d. 
222 See Trade Policy Development, supra note 220. 
223 See Policy Coordinating Group (unpublished paper available from The White House, 
Office of Policy Development (Feb. 26, 1992)). 
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domestic policy similar to the structure established for national 
security policy.224 
The PCG operates at three levels: a cabinet level Policy Coor-
dinating Group and Executive Committee; a PCG Deputies 
Group; and a PCG Working Group.225 Trade issues reviewed at 
the TPRG and TPSC level flow to the PCG Working Group on 
Economic Policy chaired by the Secretary of Treasury.226 The 
PCG Working Group members are at the Assistant Secretary level 
or above.227 The role of the Deputies Group, is to resolve issues, 
whenever possible, and to refine options on issues meriting con-
sideration by the PCG.228 
During the interagency review stage, advice is generally sought 
from the private sector advisory committees and from Con-
gress.229 While virtually all issues are developed and formulated 
through the interagency process, the USTR has definitive re-
sponsibility for making recommendations to the President, or, 
where appropriate, framing the issue for Presidential decision.230 
2. Congress 
Despite its broad constitutional authority, Congress has only a 
limited official role in conducting day-to-day trade relations be-
tween the United States and the EC. Several U.S. trade laws, such 
as the Uruguay Round fast track legislation, require the President 
to consult frequently with Congress during negotiations and in 
ongoing trade matters. 231 Congress has required the President to 
provide annual reports concerning his trade agenda and current 
trade barriers which are intended to provide opportunities for 
Congress to oversee U.S. trade developments.232 
Despite Congress's limited role in day-to-day trade relations, 
important Members of Congress and a handful of subcommittees 
playa critical role in defining the bilateral trade agenda with the 






229 See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U .S.C. § 2155 (1988). 
230 See A Preface to Trade, supra note 212, at 23. 
231 See Jeanne Jagelski, Negotiating Authority for the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (Congressional Research Service, Feb. 10, 1987). 
232 19 U.S.C. 2213 (1988). 
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Committee and the Senate Finance Committee are the primary 
sources of Congressional activity relating to European trade is-
sues, although individual members also become active on issues 
of importance to their constituencies. 
Congress has considerable leverage in urging its will upon U.S. 
negotiators. Most importantly, the Senate must ratify new 
treaties233 such as the Uruguay Round agreement of GATT. The 
Senate's role in the ratification process allows Senators to extract 
concessions in return for their support. Such specific trade-re-
lated responsibilities, however, are not necessary to give Members 
of Congress an important role in the ongoing trade debate; the 
usual give-and-take between the Congress and the Administration 
on other legislative matters provides unlimited opportunities to 
interject themselves into individual issues. 
C. Key Participants in EC Trade Policy 
1. European Commission 
The Commission is the executive branch of the European Com-
munity. The Commission's staff of about 14,000 officials primar-
ily based in Brussels is organized into 23 departments called 
Directorates General (DGs).234 The External Relations Director-
ate-known as DG-I-has primary responsibility for handling 
EC-U.S. trade relations. 
A number of officials within DG-I play an important role in 
U.S. trade matters. The Commissioner for External Relations is 
active at the same political level as the USTR or Secretary of 
State. The senior career officials-the Director-General and par-
ticularly the Deputy Director-General for the GATT-are very 
involved in both multilateral negotiations such as the Uruguay 
Round and bilateral disputes. The Uruguay Round Steering 
Group consisting of three high-level officials has important au-
thority on a wide range of trade issues. 
Virtually every subdivision of DG-I-known as directorates-
may become involved in EC-U.S. trade matters as well, depending 
on the subject matter and importance of the issue. The various 
trade issue and industry specialists in DG-I often playa significant 
role in resolving trade disputes. For example, when EC-U.S. is-
233 [d. 
234 D. LASOK & j.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
32 (1987). 
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sues involve specific industries or arise in the context of multilat-
eral trade developments, Directorate A-which includes GATT, 
agriculture, and the internal market-and Directorate D-which 
includes sectoral issues such as steel and semiconductors-have 
primary responsibility.235 The U.S. division of the North Ameri-
can affairs directorate (Directorate B) is responsible for monitor-
ing all U.S. trade developments and coordinating some Commis-
sion activity. 
As in the United States, other parts of the Commission play an 
important role in trade issues subject to their specialized jurisdic-
tion. The International Affairs Directorate within the Agriculture 
Directorate-General (DG-VI) plays an important role in the EC 
decision-making process involving bilateral and multilateral dis-
putes in agriculture. Internal Market and Industrial Affairs (DG-
III) is often the most significant participant in issues involving 
the Single Market Program. Other services of the Commission-
such as DG-IV (Competition) and DG-XIII (Telecommunica-
tions)-play a similarly important role in their areas of respon-
sibility. 
Coordination within the Commission of trade policy initiatives 
and positions, known as inter-service coordination, is not as for-
malized as is interagency coordination in the United States. In 
large part this is because of the greater importance in the Com-
munity of coordinating national policies, as discussed below. 
Much of the Commission's inter-service cooperation is informal, 
as officials from various parts of the Commission maintain fre-
quent contact in order to create and preserve consensus on a 
particular trade matter. 
Coordination also is formalized in a series of Inter-Service 
Groups which meet on an occasional basis to discuss matters of 
common interest. For example, the EC-U.S. Inter-Service Group, 
chaired by the Director for Relations with North America and 
including experts from all important Directorates-General and 
the General Secretariat, meets once a month to consider a broad 
range of EC-U.S. issues. Other Inter-Service Groups are defined 
by industry rather than geography, such as the groups concerning 
semiconductors, electronics, steel, and automobiles. The impor-
tance of these groups varies significantly and depends on the 
235 The structure of the entire Commission, including DG-I, is set forth in the DIREC-
TORY OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Feb. 1990), Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
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presence of ongoing negotiations in the field of jurisdiction and 
the availability of other less formalized means of coordination. 
2. Council of Ministers 
While the Commission manages day-to-day bilateral and mul-
tilateral trade relations, the Council of Ministers, consisting of 
the heads of governments from all twelve Member States, is re-
sponsible for making important policy decisions. 236 The Council 
is composed of representatives of national governments, normally 
ministers.237 Participation in Council meetings varies according 
to the subject at issue, so that if the subject is trade the Member 
State's trade ministers will constitute the Council. Ministers with 
jurisdiction over specific areas of trade negotiation, such as ag-
riculture, also play an important role in EC-U.S. trade matters. 
Because the individuals are officials in their own national govern-
ments, a Council member's position is largely dictated by national 
policies. The Council exerts its will on trade issues primarily 
through the "113 Committee," described below. 
3. European Parliament 
The European Parliament plays a relatively small role in EC-
U.S. trade relations. Although Parliament will gain additional 
powers in coming years, it currently does not have as much impact 
on trade matters as Congress. Parliament exercises essentially 
advisory authority, however, it can attempt to influence trade 
policy by issuing reports and presenting written questions to the 
Commission.238 Within Parliament, the Committee on External 
Economic Relations has jurisdiction over trade issues. In addition, 
the Delegation for Relations with the United States monitors U.S. 
issues and engages in exchange programs with U.S. legislators. 
4. Coordination Within the Community 
The Commission has the authority to conduct day-to-day trade 
relations while the Council has the authority to set overall trade 
policy. Thus, coordination between the two is an extremely im-
236 EEC TREATY arts. 113-14; MCGOVERN, supra note 202, at 94-96. 
237 EEC TREATY art. 2. 
238 Art. 140 of the EEC TREATY obliges the Commission to reply orally or in writing 
to questions put to it by the Parliament. 
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portant aspect of EC trade activity. This is accomplished through 
the "113 Committee," named for the article of the EEC Treaty 
providing for this coordination.239 
The 113 Committee consists of officials from both the Council 
and the Commission. The Council delegation usually consists of 
three or four representatives from each Member State. A nation's 
representation could include officials from its permanent dele-
gation in Brussels, its trade ministry, or other ministries with an 
interest in the matters to be discussed in a particular meeting, 
such as agriculture and telecommunications. It is rare that the 
ministers themselves attend the meetings. The Commission is 
represented by several officials with responsibility for the issues 
under consideration by the Committee at a meeting. The partic-
ipants in the 113 Committee meetings frequently change during 
the course of each session as new agenda items are considered. 
A secretariat coordinates the agenda and activities of the com-
mittee. Meetings of the 113 Committee normally are held on a 
weekly basis. 
The purpose of the 113 Committee is to assure that the Com-
mission's negotiating activities are consistent with the policies of 
the Council. The Commission normally has significant latitude to 
negotiate with third countries as long as it remains within the 
general policy boundaries established by the Council. As a result, 
Commission officials must consider whether it is necessary or 
useful to bring negotiating issues before the 113 Committee in 
order to keep all participants informed of important develop-
ments, to gain Council support, or to reinforce a consensus. The 
113 Committee permits this fluid interplay between the Council 
and the Commission to continue during the course of a negoti-
ation. Consideration of issues by the 113 Committee, however, 
can have a damaging effect on particularly sensitive negotiations, 
because it is difficult to preserve confidentiality in such a large 
group of differing interests. 
D. EC-U.S. Negotiating Process 
1. Multilateral, Bilateral, or Unilateral Option 
Both the EC and the United States have three basic options for 
resolving trade disputes. First, if the issue is one included in the 
Uruguay Round, the issue may be resolved in the context of the 
239 EEC TREATY art. 113. 
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multilateral GATT negotiating process. If the issue is not being 
addressed in this or any other multilateral forum, either party 
may initiate bilateral negotiations, which could eventually result 
in formation of a GATT dispute settlement panel. Finally, either 
party may act alone and retaliate unilaterally against the offend-
ing practice. 
When broad ranging multilateral negotiations such as the cur-
rent Uruguay Round are conducted under the auspices of GATT, 
trade disputes between the United States and the Community 
may be resolved in this multilateral framework. In addition, in 
individual sectors such as steel, where ongoing multilateral ne-
gotiations exist, EC-U.S. disputes may also be addressed in a 
multilateral framework. 
Bilateral negotiations are the most commonly used mechanism 
for the resolution of disputes arising between the United States 
and the EC. The first step in resolving any dispute is usually the 
request for direct bilateral discussions in Washington and Brus-
sels, starting at a technical or expert level, and moving up to the 
subcabinet or even ministerial level if the issues cannot be re-
solved at lower levels. These talks involve the types of participants 
and negotiating forums described in the previous sections. 
If the issues cannot successfully be addressed informally, either 
the United States or the EC may pursue its claim under GATT 
dispute resolution procedures.24o Two recent U.S.-initiated dis-
putes considered by GATT panels are the oilseeds case of 1989 
and the pending Airbus controversy.241 The EC also has invoked 
the GATT dispute settlement procedure in recent years, for in-
stance in the 1988 Customs User Fee proceeding, discussed 
above.242 
In recent years, annual publication by both the United States 
and the EC of offending trade practices has played a role in 
bilateral negotiations. Governments have become more aggressive 
in identifying problems and private interests have become more 
active in attempting to place their concerns on the bilateral 
agenda. Thus, both the United States and the EC have institu-
240 GATT, arts. XXII, XXIII. 
241 For background on these controversies and GATT's role in resolving them, see 
GAIT Investigative Panel, supra note 142, and EC-U.S. Negotiations on Airbus Called Difficult, 
But 'In the Right Direction,' 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 240 (Feb. 5, 1992). 
'42 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supp. No. 35, at 245 (Feb. 2, 
1988). 
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tionalized the identification of trade barriers with annual re-
ports-the so-called "trade barriers reports. "243 
In addition to the bilateral approach, in recent years, the 
United States has used a highly controversial weapon in its trade 
arsenal-the unilateral measures provided for under U.S. trade 
legislation, such as Section 301 and "Super 301" and "Special 
301" of the 1988 Trade Act. 244 Despite its rhetoric opposing 
unilateral action on principle, the United States has effectively 
used the threat of unilateral retaliation in a number of in-
stances.245 The EC enacted its own unilateral measure in 1984 
modeled after Section 301.246 This procedure-known as the New 
Commercial Policy Instrument--does not pose the same level of 
threat as Section 301 and requires recourse to GATT in resolving 
disputes. It has been used against the United States only once, 
when an investigation was initiated against U.S. patent protection 
proceedings.247 This resulted in a GATT ruling against the 
United States.248 In addition to these formalized unilateral pro-
visions, both governments may take retaliatory action in the form 
of ad hoc regulatory decisions which discriminate against the 
other in order to pursue their trade objectives. 
2. Opportunities for Negotiation 
Once each government has determined its negotiating position 
and strategy, a number of avenues are available in which U.S. 
and EC officials may meet to engage in discussions or negotia-
tions. United States and European heads of state have always met 
periodically to discuss mutual trade concerns. It is at these summit 
meetings that the most important decisions are made and political 
momentum is generated for progress in negotiations at lower 
levels of the government. 
243 In 1985, the United States began the practice of publishing an annual report on 
foreign trade barriers, which includes a country-by-country listing of alleged barriers to 
U.S. trade and an estimate of their impact on U.S. exports. See, e.g., 1991 FOREIGN TRADE 
BARRIERS REpORT, supra note 80. The EC has responded with its own even more detailed 
report, devoted solely to alleged U.S. trade barriers, which totaled 87 pages in 1991. EC 
TRADE BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 155. 
244 See supra notes 157-58; Fact Sheet, supra note 82, at 1. 
245 See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text (broadcasting); supra notes 108-10 
and accompanying text (public procurement in telecommunications); supra note 128 and 
accompanying text (meat plants); supra note 149-50 (shipbuilding subsidies). 
246 Council Regulation 2641184, 1984 OJ. (L 252) 1. 
247 Commission Decision, 1987 OJ. (L 117) 18. 
248 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supp. No. 36, at 345 (Nov. 7, 
1989). 
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These ties were strengthened in November 1990 when the EC 
and the United States signed the Transatlantic Declaration.249 
Under the declaration, the President of the United States, the 
President of the Commission, and the President of the European 
Council have committed to meet every six months to discuss a 
wide range of political, economic, and trade issues. While these 
biannual talks at the political level have not supplanted other 
contacts between heads of state, they have provided a scheduled 
and useful tool for developing the political momentum necessary 
to resolve important issues. 
Even without the summits, EC trade officials from the various 
Commission Directorates-External Relations, Agriculture, Com-
petition, and Telecommunications-and U.S. officials from 
USTR, the State Department, the Commerce Department, and 
the Department of Agriculture, long have engaged in negotia-
tions at the cabinet, subcabinet, and expert level on pending 
bilateral trade issues. In many cases, these are the most important 
talks in resolving disputes. 
At the most informal level, trade officials in the U.S. Mission 
to the Community in Brussels maintain frequent contact with all 
levels of the EC administration to monitor and influence EC trade 
policy and represent U.S. interests. The most frequent consulta-
tion of this type is the regular Monday afternoon meeting at the 
Commission. This meeting involves the Minister Counselor for 
Economic Affairs of the U.S. Mission in Brussels and the Head 
of the U.S. Division in the EC's External Relations Directorate. 
Similarly, the representatives of the EC Delegation to the United 
States in Washington, notably the Economic Affairs Counselor 
and the Deputy Head of Delegation, frequently meet with officials 
from USTR, the State Department, the Commerce Department, 
and other government agencies involved in trade matters. Due, 
however, to the apparent independence of the institutions within 
the U.S. administration, the EC representatives do not conduct a 
regular weekly meeting with U.S. officials, as is done in Brussels. 
Naturally, U.S. and EC officials also discuss matters of mutual 
interest in the various multilateral negotiations in which they 
participate. The most notable of these is the Uruguay Round 
negotiations of GATT. In these cases, the interplay of the mul-
tilateral discussions and related bilateral talks becomes quite com-
plex. 
249 The text of the Transatlantic Declaration is reprinted in European Community 
News, No. 41190, Nov. 27, 1990. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is ironic that disagreements between the United States and 
the Community have become the most difficult and intractable 
issues in the Uruguay Round. The underlying dynamics of the 
trading relationship are healthy. Trade is balanced and growing, 
and trade deficits which do occur are not the result of major 
structural imbalances. Moreover, the trade policy differences be-
tween the United States and the EC are not as great as they are 
between other trading partners. 
The current difficulties in the relationship may be the product 
of the two governments' past successes. After several decades of 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations, the easy issues have been 
resolved. Those trade frictions which remain inevitably are those 
which are most difficult to eliminate, because they are deeply 
imbedded in government policies and reflect the interests of 
strong constituencies. This is true of disputes involving govern-
ment subsidies, import quotas, high tariffs, and public procure-
ment. To some extent, the disputes reflect differing views on the 
role of government in developing new industries and supporting 
old ones. 
The large number of relatively minor disputes concerning tech-
nical standards and differing regulatory practices also result from 
the success of the overall relationship. Active trade creates trade 
issues. Trade between the United States and the Community is 
so significant and the economies have become so intertwined that 
minor problems frequently will arise. 
The leaders of the two governments recognize that their success 
in concluding and implementing a new trade agreement under 
GATT will be the most important factor in determining the 
course of EC-U.S. trade relations over the next several years. An 
agreement is necessary to resolve the hundreds of issues now on 
the table and to create a favorable environment for continuing 
discussions in areas not addressed by the Uruguay Round. The 
two governments, however, also recognize that even if the GATT 
negotiations succeed, their trade agenda will continue to be full. 
For then, they can turn to the difficult issues which remain, 
expand trading rules for new areas such as services and invest-
ment, and respond to problems caused by the growth in the 
trading relationship. 
